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THE ROLE OF GENDER INEQUALITIES IN EXPLAINING  
INCOME GROWTH, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY:  
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∗∗∗  and  Fábio Vaz
∗∗∗∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Working Paper investigates the possible link between gender inequalities in the labour 
market and significant economic outcomes such as income growth, poverty and inequality 
indicators. Our analysis is based on microsimulations for eight Latin American countries.   
We consider four aspects of gender inequalities: differences in labour market participation, 
differences in occupational status, wage discrimination and differences in characteristics.   
Our findings highlight the relevance of gender equality, especially an increase in women’s 
access to the labour market, in bringing about a reduction in poverty and inequality. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Gender inequalities, like all other inequalities unrelated to merit, are intrinsically unfair and 
wrong. The fight against gender inequalities is of genuine interest in itself. It might also be 
argued, however, that gender equality is necessary because it can bring positive outcomes  
to a whole society, such as higher economic growth and lower levels of poverty and inequality.  
This latter view has been the subject of much recent research in an effort to understand the 
possible consequences of gender inequalities for society. 
The present study is also an attempt to understand how gender inequalities affect all  
of society. We use microsimulation techniques to analyse the impact of different aspects of 
gender inequalities on household income distribution, in terms of income growth and levels  
of poverty and inequality. We consider four aspects of gender inequalities related to the labour 
market. The first is the difference between men and women in entry to the labour market, 
which results in a disparity of male and female participation in the labour force. The second is 
the distinct occupational status of women and men, which may be represented by higher 
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female rates of unemployment or informality. The third is wage discrimination—that is, lower 
remuneration for women’s productive characteristics. The fourth aspect of gender inequalities 
affecting the labour market consists of differences in men’s and women’s characteristic 
endowments. We use microsimulations to remove each of these components of gender 
inequalities from the labour market. The counterfactual household income distributions that 
emerge from each simulation are analysed considering mean income growth, poverty and 
inequality indicators. The research covers eight Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
The paper is organised as follow. This introduction is followed by a section that provides 
background information and establishes the study’s main objectives. The third section 
discusses the methodology. The fourth presents the data on the countries being analysed, 
while the fifth presents the results. Finally, the sixth section concludes. 
2  BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The link between gender and economic growth has been examined from a macroeconomic 
perspective. The most popular technique in the macro approach to this issue is cross-country 
regression analysis. Examples of research papers based on this methodology are Dollar and 
Gatti (1999), Klasen (2002), and Klasen and Lamanna (2003), which examine the relation 
between economic growth and gender gaps in education and employment. The overall 
finding is a negative correlation between gender gaps and economic growth, although the 
details of the results vary with model specifications. 
The theory underlying these macro studies relies on certain channels to explain how 
gender inequalities affect economic growth. One of the arguments used to explain how a 
gender gap in education produces economic inefficiency is that the exclusion of women from 
educational achievements limits the supply of skilled people. Another explanation concerns 
the externalities of greater female education, which are lower fertility levels and improved 
human capital among children. The relation between growth and the gender gap in 
employment have similar channels of transmission, though here the matter is more 
complicated because of reverse causality. Nonetheless, higher levels of female employment 
entail an increase in the supply of skilled people in the labour market, as well as a growth in 
female intra-household bargaining power that produces a rise in children’s human capital.1 
Attempts to establish a macro link between gender equality and growth are interesting, 
but the micro approach can also be very helpful in establishing a comprehensive context 
within which gender inequalities affect household income growth, as well as levels of poverty 
and inequality. As developed by Bourguignon et al. (2001), the microsimulations comprise a 
decomposition method that is key in this type of analysis. This method is an extension of the 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973) and the distribution decomposition conducted 
by Juhn et al. (1993). These methods have been extensively used to analyse wage differentials, 
including the gender wage gap.  
The decomposition developed by Bourguignon et al. (2001) includes an analysis of the 
occupational structure, thus facilitating an examination of household income distribution. 
Hence this technique can be used to analyse the impact of labour market features on 
characteristics of household income distribution, such as levels of poverty and inequality.  
This decomposition method must be carefully interpreted to draw causal inferences, though it Working Paper  3 
 
might help shed some light on the links between changes in the labour market and household 
income distribution. According to Shorrocks (1999: 1): “Decomposition techniques are used in 
many fields of economics to help disentangle and quantify the impact of various causal  
factors. Their use is particularly widespread in studies of poverty and inequality.” The use  
of microsimulations is a promising way of investigating the relationship between gender 
inequalities on the one hand, and poverty and inequality levels on the other. Indeed, it has 
already been used. Examples are Ferreira and Barros (2004), Gradín et al. (2006), Scorzafave 
(2004) and Bourguignon et al. (2001).  
Applying this technique, Ferreira and Barros (2004) found that a narrowing of the gender 
wage gap contributed to lower Brazilian poverty levels in the period 1976–1996, while Gradín 
et al. (2006) found that wage discrimination is a relevant determinant of poverty levels in 
European countries. On the other hand, both Scorzafave (2004) and Bourguignon et al. (2001) 
showed that recent increases in the female labour force had an inequality-increasing effect in 
Brazil and Taiwan, respectively. In both countries this result is attributed to the fact that the 
women who entered the labour force had high levels of education and already belonged to 
the higher strata of the household income distribution. 
In a micro model, there is a straightforward link between gender inequalities, a rise in 
income and poverty. For instance, an increase in women’s education leads to an increase  
in the female labour force and productivity, which drive up women’s earnings. The rise in 
female earnings leads to higher levels of household income and consumption—that is, an 
increase in current income and a reduction in poverty. Additionally, the reduction of current 
gender inequalities might affect children’s human capital and savings, entailing an impact on 
future income growth and poverty reduction.2  
The present study is based on microsimulation techniques and a micro conceptual 
framework. We simulate the suppression of different gender inequalities in the labour market 
and build different counterfactual household income distributions. These counterfactual 
income distributions are compared to the original one in order to estimate the impact of  
each simulation in terms of an increase in income and a reduction in poverty and inequality. 
We examine four aspects of labour market-related gender inequalities: differences in labour 
market participation, disparities in occupational status, wage discrimination, and divergences 
in characteristic endowments.  
One caveat must be noted about this methodology. These simulation exercises represent 
partial equilibrium results—that is, the estimated impacts do not consider possible general 
equilibrium effects. Because of this limitation, the results must be interpreted as rough 
estimates of what would happen if gender inequalities were eliminated, not as the final 
equilibrium. Additionally, our results allow for an analysis of the relative importance of each 
aspect of gender inequality in explaining income growth and level of poverty and inequality.  
We now turn to an analysis of the sources of each of the four aspects of gender inequality 
being considered in this study.3 The gender gap in the rates of labour force participation stems 
not only from differences in characteristics between men and women but also from differences 
in the probabilities of labour market participation among men and women with similar 
characteristics. A possible explanation for women’s lower probability of being economically 
active is that they might face barriers in access to the labour market. One of these barriers 
could be that they are responsible for domestic duties, and a lack of support (such as childcare 
facilities) might prevent them from entering the labour force. Other barriers that discourage 4  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
women from joining the labour force might be the poor conditions they face in the labour 
market, such as wage discrimination and the struggle to find jobs, particularly high-quality 
jobs. Gender roles and cultural factors could also pose obstacles because there might be social 
disapproval of economically active women, or they might face legal impediments. There might 
be other kinds of barriers to women’s entry into the labour market. On the other hand, the 
decision to be economically inactive can also be an option freely chosen by women who want 
to devote their time to the home. Regardless of the reasons for the lower probability of women 
joining the labour force, our methodology equalises the probabilities of women and men 
participating in the labour market, conditional on their characteristics, in order to reduce the 
discrepancy between female and male participation rates. 
The second aspect of gender inequalities analysed is that women and men occupy very 
different positions once they are economically active. In other words, there is a gender gap in 
unemployment, formality and informality rates. Again, this gap depends on gender differences 
in characteristics and a disparity in the probabilities of being unemployed, or a formal or 
informal worker, between men and women with similar characteristics. Some barriers might  
be preventing women from finding jobs or formal jobs, and thus they are more likely to be 
unemployed or to work informally. For example, employers (particularly formal employers) 
might avoid hiring women of reproductive age. It is also possible, however, that the gender 
differences in the probabilities are the result of a free choice. For instance, women may prefer 
informal jobs because they offer more flexible working hours. In an effort to reduce the gender 
discrepancies in rates of unemployment, formality and informality, our methodology equalises 
the probabilities of being unemployed, formal or informal between men and women with 
equivalent characteristics, notwithstanding the causes of the different probabilities. 
The wage gap is the third feature of gender inequalities in the labour market examined 
here. Gender differences in characteristics and divergent remuneration for characteristics 
between women and men are the causes of the gender gap in the hourly wage. If women and 
men receive different prices for the same characteristics, there is wage discrimination in the 
labour market. To narrow the gender wage gap, our methodology equalises the price that 
women and men obtain for their characteristics, so that women and men with similar 
characteristics receive the same hourly wage. 
The gap in characteristic endowments is the fourth aspect of gender inequalities studied. 
This gender gap is generated outside the labour market but it produces different labour 
market outcomes for men and women, such as different participation rates, different 
occupations and different pay. We simulate identical characteristic endowments to investigate 
how labour market outcomes would be different between men and women. 
The channel of transmission whereby gender equality affects income growth and levels  
of poverty and inequality is explained directly from our micro model. Promoting gender 
equality in terms of equalising women’s and men’s probabilities of being economically active, 
unemployed, formal or informal, balancing women’s and men’s wages, and levelling women’s 
and men’s characteristics might entail an increase in total female earnings. Sequentially, higher 
female earnings increase levels of household income and consumption, thereby reducing 
poverty and raising the income level. The following section explains this link in detail as we 
describe the methodology used, which is based on Bourguignon et al. (2001). Working Paper  5 
 
3  METHODOLOGY 
3.1  HOUSEHOLD INCOME MODEL AND ITS LABOUR MARKET DETERMINANTS 
Household income is the total amount of income received by individuals living in the 
household, while individual income is the sum of individual labour income and individual  
non-labour income. Thus household income (
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where the subscript i indicates each individual living in the household and the subscript j refers 
to each economic activity status; 
j
i I is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if individual 
i’s main economic activity is j, and 0 otherwise; 
j
i Y is individual labour income in main 
economic activity j; 
sl
i I is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if individual i has other 
economic activities and 0 otherwise; 
sl
i Y is the individual labour income of secondary 
economic activities; and 
nl
i Y  is total individual non-labour income.  
Though it is not possible to estimate econometrically the household income equation,  
it is not too difficult to discuss its labour market determinants. To analyse how labour market 
structure affects household income, we must consider the determinants of the income 
generated in the labour market. Two estimation models are necessary: one that determines the 
labour market participation structure, and another that considers the remuneration structure. 
In the labour market participation structure model analysed here, individuals of 
economically active age can be divided into four groups: economically inactive, unemployed, 
formal worker and informal worker. Nonetheless, we consider that the decision among these 
four categories does not happen simultaneously.4 First, individuals face the decision of 
whether to become economically active. Then, once they decide to participate in the labour 
market, they have to choose whether to continue looking for a job or to accept a formal or an 
informal job offer. That is, they make the decision to be unemployed or to be a formal or 
informal worker in their main occupation. Hence the labour market participation structure is 
determined by a sequential decision. 
Because of the nature of the decision, we use the sequential logit estimation with two 
stages as recommended by Maddala (1983) and Liao (1994). The two stages are considered 
independent and estimated separately, and thus the probability of choice in one stage is 
considered independently of the probability of choice in the other stage. Hence the 
participation decision is modelled by a logit considering the entire sample (i.e., economically 
active and inactive individuals), while the occupational decision is estimated by a multinomial 
logit model only for a subsample (economically active individuals). 
The probability of being economically active (
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and the probability of being in each category status j (unemployed, formal worker, informal 
worker) conditional on being economically active (
j














= ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ∑
, (3) 
where λ is the vector of parameters estimated in the first stage by the binary logit, 
j γ represents the vector of parameters of each category j estimated by the multinomial logit 
in the second stage, and  i Z  represents the vector of explanatory variables.  
Both the binary logit and the multinomial logit models can be considered in a utility 
maximising process. In the first stage of the sequential decision, there is a latent variable  
for each individual, which could be the individual utility of being economically active,  
and it is given by 
*
ii i UZ
λ λ ε =+ , (4) 
where 
λ εi  is symmetrically distributed with zero mean and it has F(
λ εi ) as the cumulative 
distribution function. 
The individual will decide to become part of the labour force only if 
* 0 i U > ; otherwise 
he/she will choose to be outside the labour market. Therefore, the probability that the 
individual is economically active (
A
i P ) is 
() ( ) ( ) 01 ( )
A
ii i i i i i PP Z P Z F ZF Z
λλ λε ε λ λ λ =+ > = > − = − − =
. (5) 
If F(
λ εi ) is a logistic distribution, we have a binary logit model as implied by equation (2). 
The vector of parameters  λ  is estimated by the method of maximum likelihood. In addition, 
the error term (
λ εi ) for each individual can be imputed considering its distribution and the 
restriction implied by equation (5).  
In the second stage of the sequential decision, those who decided to participate in the 
labour market will have to choose an economic activity status. Consider that there are latent 
variables for each possible outcome j, which can be considered as the utility associated with 
each economic activity status j (being unemployed, a formal worker or an informal worker), 
*
ij j i ij VZ
γ γ ε =+
, (6) Working Paper  7 
 
where 
λ εij  is independently, identically distributed extreme value. The unconditional 
probability of economic status j being chosen is given by (
Vj
i P ) 
( ) ,
Vj
ij i i j k i i k PP Z Z j k
γγ γε γε =+ > + ∀ ≠
. (7) 
















which explains equation (3). Therefore the second stage is a multinomial logit model and the 
vector of parameters of each outcome ( j γ ) is estimated by maximum likelihood. The residuals 
( ij
γ ε ) can be imputed regarding its distribution and the restrictions imposed by (7).  
Since our aim is to compare the participation-occupational decisions made by women 
and men, the sequential logit model is estimated separately for women and men. Thus, in the 
participation decision, we will have () ' ˆˆ , wm λ λ  as estimated parameters and () , iw im
λλ ε ε  as 
imputed residuals, where the subscript w stands for women and the subscript m  for men. In 
the occupational decision, we will have estimated ( ) ˆˆ , jwj m γ γ  as parameters and imputed 
() , ijw ijm
γγ ε ε  as residuals. 
As mentioned above, the vector  i Z  represents the vector of explanatory variables  
used in estimating the sequential decision model for both men and women.  
The characteristics considered are education, age, race,5 marital status, non-labour 
income, region, number of children, school attendance, the presence of elderly in the 
household, and the number of unemployed and informal workers in the household.  
The educational variables are dummy variables that indicate if the individual has no level 
of formal education, incomplete primary, complete primary,6 incomplete secondary, complete 
secondary or university level. The non-labour income is calculated for each individual as the 
logarithm of total household income without the individual labour income, and divided by  
the number of people in the household. The squared form of the non-labour income is also 
present in the model. The number of children variables depend on the age and sex of children; 
we use the number of 0–3 year-old children, 4–6 year-old children, 7–10 year-old boys, 7–10 
year-old girls, 11–15 year-old boys and 11–15 year-old girls.7 The number of unemployed and 
informal workers in the household is calculated excluding the individual himself/herself if 
he/she is in one of these categories. Moreover, we use as explanatory variables age, age 
squared, dummy variable for race,8 dummy variable if married, dummy variables for regions, 
dummy variable if the person is attending school, and dummy variable if there is an elderly 
person (65 years or older) in the household. 8  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
The next step in understanding how the labour market affects household income is to 
estimate the determinants of wage equation. Because of some features of the simulations, we 
will consider two definitions of wage: one is the monthly wage of the main job and the other is 
the hourly wage of the main job. So the wage equations estimated are: 
ln ij j i ij YX
β β ε =+
, (9) 
ln ij j i ij yX
θ θ ε =+
, (10) 
where  ij Y  is the monthly wage of individual i in his/her main occupation  j ,  ij y  is the hourly 
wage of individual iin his/her main occupation  j ,  i X  is the vector of explanatory variables, 
and  ij
β ε  and  ij
θ ε  are the residuals, which capture the effects of unobserved characteristics.  
The parameters  j β  and  j θ  are estimated using ordinary weighted least squares. 
These equations are estimated separately, not only for women and men but also for 
formal and informal workers. As a result, we will have estimated( ) ˆˆ , j w wj m ββ , which represent  
a total of four estimated parameter vectors for the monthly wage equation. Analogously,  
we will have ( ) ˆˆ , jwj m θ θ  as estimated parameter vectors in the hourly wage equation. 
Additionally, for those individuals who participate in these wage regressions,  ij
β ε  and  ij
θ ε   
will be automatically calculated.  
There are still three important issues to mention about the estimation of our labour 
market model (participation-occupational-wage structure). One is that we are considering only 
the main occupation of the individual to classify him/her as a formal or informal worker. We do 
not include analysis of the second job in our model, even though the second-job earnings are 
part of the household income. To model the participation-occupational structure fully,  
we would also have to estimate the probability of a person who is economically active  
having a second job. Our labour market analysis, however, is confined to the main occupation 
of each worker. We estimate neither the probability of participation in a second job nor the 
second job wage equation. 
Another important issue is that the participation-occupational equations are  
reduced-form equations. In the structural model, wages are significant determinants of  
the participation-occupational equations. To estimate these equations, we obtain their 
reduced form by replacing the wages with their determinants. 
Finally, we should mention that a sample selection bias correction procedure could be 
used in the estimation of the wage equation, since the error terms and the explanatory 
variables in these equations might be correlated. However, as argued by Ferreira and Paes de 
Barros (2004), the assumptions required to correct sample selection are as strong as assuming 
that the errors in the wage equation are independently distributed. Working Paper  9 
 
3.2   SIMULATING THE ROLE OF GENDER INEQUALITIES IN EXPLAINING  
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
The model described above is a very helpful tool in understanding how labour market 
characteristics affect household income distribution. More specifically, we use it to clarify the 
implications of gender inequalities in the labour market for income distribution. We simulate 
hypothetical scenarios without gender inequalities in the labour market and construct 
counterfactual income distributions, which are compared to the actual distribution. 
The present analysis focuses on four aspects of gender inequalities: the different labour 
market participation rates, the difference in occupations among the economically active,  
the different remuneration of productive characteristics, and the disparities in characteristic 
endowments. Each of these aspects of gender inequalities is connected to different labour 
market-related features.  
Our counterfactual-based simulations try to answer four questions: 
1.  How would total income distribution be if the effects of the determinants  
of labour market participation for women were the same as those for men? 
2.  How would total income distribution be if the effects of the determinants  
of occupational status for women were the same as those for men? 
3.  How would total income distribution be if women were remunerated the  
same as men for their characteristics? 
4.  How would total income distribution be if women had the same  
characteristics as men? 
 
To answer the first question, we simulate the female participation equation, which is  
the first stage of the participation-occupational sequential decision. In this simulation,  
women and men with equal observed characteristics would have the same probability of 
being economically active. To achieve this result, we replace the female estimated coefficients 
in the female participation equation with the male ones. As a result, the simulated decision of 





wm w w c UZ
λ λ ε =+
, (11) 
where  1 c  stands for first counterfactual. And the simulated probability of women being 














+ . (12) 
On the basis of this simulated decision of participating in the labour market, different 
women decide to enter  the labour market or not. The earnings of women who decided to stay 
out of labour market are equal to zero. Those who were originally in the labour market keep 
their original occupational status and, if employed, their original wage. The occupational status 10  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
of those who were not originally in the labour market is defined by their characteristics and the 
choice mechanism of the female occupational decision. More specifically, for those women 
who first become economically active, we calculate their second-stage utilities (or latent 
variables) considering the estimated female multinomial logit coefficients, their characteristics 
and their imputed residuals. The residuals were imputed for them regarding only the mean 
and standard deviation of the residuals distribution. The comparison among utilities 
determines which occupational status is chosen: unemployed, formal worker or informal 
worker. If the choice is not to be unemployed, the wage of those women is given by the 
estimated female monthly wage equation of the occupation chosen (formal or informal). Since 
these women were not part of the wage equation estimations, they do not have a residual term 
to include in their wages computation. Thus we impute wage residuals for them, observing the 
mean and the standard deviation of each residual distribution (formal or informal). 




c Y . Thus we will have the first counterfactual household income distribution, 
which is the income distribution that would prevail if there were no gender differences in 
access to the labour market. 
The second question requires a simulation of the female occupational equation. If the 
effects of the determinants of occupational status were the same for men and women, then 
men and women with equal observed characteristics would have the same probabilities of 
being unemployed, formal workers or informal workers once they are economically active. 
Thus we only have to replace the female estimated multinomial logit coefficients for the  
male ones in the second stage of the female participation-occupational sequential decision. 
This means that the simulated women’s occupational status decision is based on the following 
utilities (or latent variables) associated with each outcome: 
()
*
2 ˆ wj mj w wj c VZ
γ γ ε =+
, (13) 
where  2 c  refers to second counterfactual. The counterfactual probability of being in each 
occupational status j (unemployed, formal or informal worker), conditional on being 















= ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ∑
. (14) 
It is important to note that the participation structure is kept the same, since we only 
modify the occupational equation. After women’s occupational structure is simulated, we must 
calculate wages for those who changed occupations. If a woman becomes unemployed, her 
earnings are zero. But the earnings of those who took either a formal or informal position  
will be calculated according to the monthly wage equation of the formal or informal sectors. 
Moreover, their wage residuals are imputed considering the mean and standard deviation of 
the residual distributions, so that they can be included in their wages. Having the simulated 
wage distribution is sufficient to obtain the second counterfactual household income Working Paper  11 
 
distribution, which is the income distribution that would prevail if there were no gender labour 
market segmentation, ( )
2
H
c Y . 
To answer the third question we must simulate the hourly wage equation. In the hourly 
wage equation, the estimated coefficients, ( ) ˆˆ , jwj m θ θ , are the prices women and men receive 
for their characteristics in the labour market; no wage discrimination implies that these prices 
are the same. We replace women’s coefficient in the female wage equation by men’s; hence 
women and men with same observed characteristics receive the same remuneration for them. 
Women’s original wages, therefore, are 
ln wj wj w wj yX
θ θ ε =+
, (15) 
and their simulated wages are  
()
3 ln wj mj w wj c yX
θ θ ε =+
, (16) 
where  3 c  refers to third counterfactual. Note that in this simulation, the participation-
occupational structure remains constant, while the wages for those women in the formal or 
informal sectors are re-estimated. When we have the simulated wage distribution, we calculate 
the third counterfactual household income distribution, ( )
3
H
c Y . This counterfactual represents 
the income distribution that would prevail if there were no wage discrimination against 
women’s observed characteristics. 
A complete analysis of the third question requires that we consider the difference in the 
prices of unobserved characteristics. For women to receive the same remuneration as men for 
their unobserved characteristics, we must equalise the standard deviation of women’s and 
men’s residual distributions. Thus we modify female residual distributions so that they have 
the male standard deviations. The simulated women’s wages are 
() ()
4 ln wj mj w mj wj wj c yX
θ θθ θ σσε =+
, (17) 
where  4 c  refers to fourth counterfactual, and ( ) mj wj
θθ σ σ  is the ratio between male residual 
standard deviation and female residual standard deviation related to the monthly wage 
equation in the formal or informal sector(j). With these simulated wages, women receive the 
same price as men for their observed and unobserved characteristics in the labour market.  




c Y , which is what the income distribution would be if there were no wage 
discrimination against women’s observed and unobserved characteristics.  
The answer to the fourth question demands a simulation involving all the equations in  
the model. We replace the female characteristics by the male ones in all steps of the model.  
First, we change women’s characteristics (Z) in the participation and occupational equations.  
 12  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   






ww m w c UZ
λ λ ε =+
, (18) 
where  5 c  refers to fifth counterfactual. Then, considering only those women who become 
economically active, we simulate the occupational equation by calculating the utilities that  
will support the occupational decision. Thus the female state of being unemployed, or a formal 
or informal worker, depends on the following simulated latent variables: 
()
*
5 ˆ wj wj m wj c VZ
γ γ ε =+
. (19) 
Then, knowing the women who are formal and informal workers, we have to change 
women’s characteristics (X) in the wage equation and calculate their wages. Thus the 
simulated wages are: 
()
5
ˆ ln wj wj m wj c YX
β β ε =+
. (20) 
Note, however, that in equation (20) we are changing only the observed characteristics, 
though it is possible to change the unobserved characteristics as well. Modifying the female 
unobserved characteristics but keeping their price constant entails the following formula  
for the simulated wage: 




mj wj wj wj m wj mj wj c YX F F ββ
ββ β
εε βσ σ ε
− =+ . (21) 
On the basis of these simulated wage distributions we can compute the fifth and  
sixth counterfactual household income distributions, ( )
5
H
c Y  and ( )
6
H
c Y , respectively.  
The fifth counterfactual represents what the income distribution would be if there were no 
gender differences in the observed characteristics, while the sixth counterfactual describes  
the income distribution that would prevail if there were no gender differences in observed  
and unobserved characteristics. 
3.3  ANALYSING THE SIMULATION RESULTS 
The methodology explained in the previous section provides six counterfactuals of household 
income distribution, which are helpful in understanding how the different aspects of gender 
inequalities explain some features of the distribution. Though we use a decomposition 
methodology, we are more interested in its counterfactual interpretation. We are concerned 
with constructing counterfactuals to represent what the household income distribution would 
be if certain aspect of gender inequalities were eliminated from the labour market, considering 
all other gender inequalities to be constant. Comparison of these counterfactuals uncovers 
which aspect of gender inequalities has more significant potential effects on the household Working Paper  13 
 
income distribution. For this reason we eliminate only one aspect of gender inequalities  
at a time, rather than removing them sequentially.9  
Our interest is in assessing the impact of gender inequalities on the level of household 
income, and also on levels of poverty and inequality. To obtain these indicators, household 
income is divided by the number of individuals living in the household, so that we can analyse 
the distribution of per capita household income. For each counterfactual, therefore, we 
measure the mean per capita income level, the poverty indicators and the inequality indices to 
compare them with the original ones. By examining these measures, we are able to estimate 
the burden that different aspects of gender inequalities may represent for society as a whole. 
In order to capture the poverty levels in the per capita income distribution, we use the 
poverty incidence and the poverty gap as poverty measures. Two poverty lines are used to 
avoid our results being dependent on the poverty line chosen. The poverty line values are 
defined as the value of the household per capita income of the twentieth and thirtieth 
percentiles of the original distribution. This means that for each country analysed we use 
poverty line values that consider 20 per cent and 30 per cent of the population as poor.10  
These poverty line values are used to calculate the original poverty gap, as well as the 
counterfactual poverty incidence and poverty gap indices. Since the outputs are not sensitive 
to the poverty line chosen, we opted to present the results related to the twentieth percentile 
poverty line.11 The inequality in the household per capita distribution is measured by the Gini 
index.12 Thus our analysis is based on a comparison of the original values of the poverty and 
inequality indicators with the counterfactual ones.  
There is an important caveat to note regarding the methodology presented here.  
The results presented in the next section are essentially products of a partial equilibrium 
exercise—that is, no general equilibrium effects are considered. In other words, our simulations 
contemplate a ceteris paribus scenario, which does not consider all possible consequences of our 
simulated hypothesis for the economy. Nonetheless, although the results are based on a partial 
equilibrium model, they approximately represent the relevance of each aspect of gender 
inequalities in order to explain the actual income level and the indices of poverty and 
inequality. Consequently, this methodology enables us not only to discuss the implications  
of gender inequalities for society as a whole, but also to investigate which aspect of gender 
inequalities is more significant in explaining levels of income, poverty and inequality. The 
methodology can thus be helpful to policymakers, since it can shed light on the potential of 
each aspect of gender inequalities to increase income and to reduce poverty and inequality. 
4  DATA ANALYSIS 
4.1  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The methodology proposed by this study can be applied to the standard household  
survey data of any country. We applied it to eight Latin American countries: Argentina 
(Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, 2006; first semester), Brazil (Pesquisa Nacional por  
Amostra de Domicílios, 2006), Chile (Encuesta de Caracterizacion Socioeconomica Nacional, 
2003), the Dominican Republic (Encuesta de Panel de Fuerza de Trabajo, 2002; October),  
El Salvador (Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples, 2004), Mexico (Encuesta Nacional  14  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares, 2006), Paraguay (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, 2005)  
and Uruguay (Encuesta Continua de Hogares, 2004). 
However, since the labour market functions very differently in urban and rural areas,  
the present analysis is confined to urban areas only. The background reason is that the labour 
market concepts and the market’s generated income are very important to this methodology. 
Hence all income distribution statistics in this paper reflect only the urban situation.  
The urban population accounts for the following shares of the total population13 in the 
countries examined: Argentina (89 per cent), Brazil (83.3 per cent), Chile (86.9 per cent),  
the Dominican Republic (64.4 per cent), El Salvador (65.06 per cent), Mexico (76.9 per cent), 
Paraguay (58 per cent) and Uruguay (92 per cent).14 
Limiting the analysis to urban areas is not sufficient to make all data sets comparable; we 
also need strict definitions of income and labour market characteristics. Although it is not the 
purpose of this study to make a direct comparison among countries, it is still interesting to 
have similar variables across countries so that the methodology applied is as close as possible. 
Consequently, we have included both monetary income and estimated monetary values  
from in-kind payments in household income, but not self-consumption and imputed rental 
fee. The monthly wage and the hourly wage used in the wage equation are only monetary 
income. The monetary incomes provided by these surveys are before-tax but they include 
government transfers. Nevertheless, it is not enough to escape certain surveys’ specificities 
about monetary income, such as imputed variables for the missing ones or values corrected  
for the national accounts (only Chile). Thus, for datasets with missing values in wage variables,  
we imputed values considering some individual characteristics: sex, occupational category and 
educational level.15 Apart from these problems is the fact that different surveys capture income 
in different ways. We therefore made an effort to construct similar income variables across 
countries, though it was not feasible to have exactly the same measure. This is a not a huge 
problem, since it is not our aim to ensure total comparability among countries. 
Though the study refers to the urban population, the group actually considered in the 
labour market simulations is even smaller. The simulation exercises are conducted only for  
18–64 year-old individuals, since we consider those people to be of economically productive 
age. Additionally, we adopted common definitions related to the labour market features for  
all countries. We considered as economically inactive all those who neither work for a wage at 
least one hour per week nor search for a job. The economically active are defined complementarily 
and characterised as unemployed, formal or informal workers. The unemployed are those who 
have searched for a job. Formal workers are employees and employers in industry or services 
who work in a firm with more than five employees, and self-employed liberal professionals. 
Informal workers are paid domestic servants, the self-employed who are not liberal 
professionals, and employees and employers in industry or services who work in a firm with 
five employees or fewer. It is important to note that workers in agriculture, public or unpaid 
occupations are not included in any of the categories defined above.  
Given these labour market definitions, for all the countries analysed we present some 
statistics that can characterise the existence of gender inequalities in their labour market.16 
Table 1 shows the difference in the labour-market participation rates between women and 
men. The rate of female labour-market participation is very low; the highest rate of economic 
activity among women is 62 per cent in Paraguay, and the lowest is 47 per cent in Chile. There 
is a clear gender gap in labour-force participation in the eight countries: the average female Working Paper  15 
 
participation is about 56 per cent, whereas the male rate is above 80 per cent. Additionally, the 
female economic activity rate, on average, is 66 per cent that of the male rate; this ratio can be 
as high as 70 per cent in Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, or as low as 59 per cent in Chile. These 
figures suggest that men and women do not have equal access to the labour market in the 
Latin American countries analysed. 
Table 2 shows occupational status for people who are economically active, disaggregated 
by gender. In general, we can say that men have a higher rate of formality and women have 
higher rates of informality and unemployment. The female formality rate is not higher than 86 
per cent of the male rate in the Dominican Republic and not less than 60 per cent in Paraguay. 
On the other hand, the rate of female informality is 47 per cent more than the male rate in  
El Salvador, and 2 per cent higher in Uruguay. The only exception is the Dominican Republic, 
where the female informality rate is just 86 per cent of the male one. The rate of female 
unemployment is more than twice the rate of male unemployment in the Dominican Republic, 
and is higher than the male rate in all but two countries: El Salvador and Mexico. 
Table 3 shows the wage gender gap. The average female-to-male monthly wage ratio is 
62 per cent; it is 75 per cent in El Salvador and 51 per cent in Paraguay. This ratio, however, 
represents not only gender differences in endowments and remuneration but also in total time 
spent at work. Since women are over-represented in part-time jobs, the female-to-male hourly 
wage ratio is preferred to describe the pure gender wage gap. As expected, the hourly wage 
ratio is, on average, 77 per cent, which is higher than the previous one. It ranges from 61 per 
cent in Paraguay to 86 per cent in Uruguay. 
Table 4 presents the educational attainment of women and men according to the 
categories defined above. It is interesting to note that there is no prominent educational 
gender gap in these countries, since on average the gender difference in educational years is 
0.37. The highest gender difference is about one year, in El Salvador and Mexico. In Brazil and 
Argentina, women have an even higher mean of educational years than men. Nonetheless, 
Table 4 indicates a relevant gap, which is the educational divide between economically active 
women and inactive women.17 On average, women who are part of the labour force have 1.5 
more years of schooling than inactive women. In Brazil and the Dominican Republic this gap is 
about two years. A last point to note in Table 4 is that, among the economically active, the 
most educated are in formal occupations. 
TABLE 1 
Labour Market Participation, Actual Conditions 
  Economic Activity Rate 
Ratio of Female to Male 
Economic Activity Rate (%) 
  Male (%)  Female (%) 
Argentina, 2006  85.18  54.12  63.54 
Brazil, 2006  85.48  59.98  70.17 
Chile, 2003  80.33  47.21  58.77 
Dominican Republic, 2002  86.70  57.98  66.87            
El Salvador, 2004  82.71  56.63  68.47 
Mexico, 2006  87.96  53.29  60.58 
Paraguay, 2005  88.31  62.05  70.26 
Uruguay, 2004  86.78  60.94  70.22 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 16  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
TABLE 2 
Labour Market Segmentation, Actual Conditions 
  Formality Rate (%)  Informality Rate (%)  Unemployment (%) 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Argentina,  2006  44.94 33.30 44.24 48.62 10.83 18.08 
Brazil,  2006  52.50 37.90 39.15 47.66  8.35  14.44 
Chile,  2003  56.64 40.09 32.21 44.21 11.14 15.71 
Dominican  Republic,  2002  42.62 36.44 45.58 39.04 11.79 24.52 
El  Salvador,  2004  52.22 39.76 37.99 55.87  9.79  4.37 
Mexico,  2006  55.24 46.44 40.94 51.26  3.82  2.30 
Paraguay,  2005  34.28 20.74 58.39 68.86  7.33  10.40 
Uruguay,  2004  45.68 36.52 42.89 43.74 11.43 19.74 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
 
TABLE 3 
Wage Differential, Actual Conditions 
   Ratio of Female to Male  
Monthly Wage (%) 
Ratio of Female to Male  
Hourly Wage (%) 
Argentina, 2006  62.79 83.07 
Brazil, 2006  61.20 74.19 
Chile, 2003  60.31 73.33 
Dominican Republic, 2002  66.39 82.74 
El Salvador, 2004  74.98 81.29 
Mexico, 2006  59.99 78.69 
Paraguay, 2005  50.57 60.96 
Uruguay, 2004  61.22 85.54 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
 
TABLE 4 
Educational Endowment (Years of Education), Actual Conditions 
   Inactive Active Formal  Informal  Unemployed  Total 
Argentina, 2006 
Men  11.08 10.56 11.30  9.85  10.33 10.65 
Women 10.22 11.29 13.09 10.07  11.25 10.76 
Brazil, 2006 
Men  6.80 8.20 9.07 7.07  8.09 7.90 
Women 6.80 8.74  10.45 7.33  8.86 7.94 
Chile, 2003 
Men  11.41 11.24 11.96 10.17  10.71 10.51 
Women 10.19 11.41 13.12  9.87  11.38  9.94 
Dominican Republic, 2002 
Men  8.93 9.07  10.60 7.55  9.40 9.42 
Women 7.66 9.84  11.72 7.85  10.22 9.37 
El Salvador, 2004  
Men  9.71 9.39  10.69 7.77  8.76 9.06 
Women 7.36 8.67  12.00 6.11  11.13 7.80 
Mexico, 2006 
Men  10.81 9.98  10.92 8.76  9.58 9.96 
Women 8.40 9.83  11.75 8.02  11.30 9.09 
Paraguay, 2005 
Men  9.53 9.34  10.55 8.75  8.44 9.39 
Women 8.24 9.31  12.45 8.18  10.52 8.87 
Uruguay, 2004 
Men  8.65 9.54  10.38 8.66  9.46 9.65 
Women  8.72 10.14 11.98  8.80  9.69  9.83 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. Working Paper  17 
 
4.2  REGRESSION RESULTS 
The appendix presents tables showing all the regression outputs for all countries. On the basis 
of these results we can infer the determinants of the labour market participation decision, 
occupational position and wage for each country. The analysis of each of the estimated 
equations and their coefficients deserves further attention. Since this is not the purpose  
of the present paper, we draw only some general conclusions. The conclusions about these 
determinants reinforce some previous findings in the literature. The paragraphs below 
summarise the most important determinants in each stage that can be generalised for  
all countries analysed, with only a few exceptions. 
As regards the participation decision, note that the probability of being economically 
active is highly and significantly influenced by educational level. The higher the educational 
attainment, the higher the chances of participating in the labour force. There is also a 
significant inverted U-shape relation between age and the probability of entering the labour 
market. Non-labour income, school attendance, the presence of elderly and the number of 
unemployed in the household negatively affect the chances of being economically active.  
Two important features of the female participation decision should be mentioned: the 
negative influence of being married and the negative impact of children, particularly young 
ones. These variables are relevant because they are related to the social role of women in 
society as housewives and mothers. 
Education also plays a key role in the occupational decision. High levels of education 
increase the probability of being a formal worker rather than an informal worker or 
unemployed. Again, age shows a significant inverted U-shape with the probability of being 
formal and the probability of being informal rather than unemployed. The number of informal 
workers in the household significantly increases the probability of being informal, while the 
number of unemployed in the household significantly increases the probability of the 
individual being unemployed. Analysing the results of the participation-occupational model as 
a whole, we can infer that the presence of unemployed people in a household is a stimulus to 
other members to participate in the labour market. Though they are looking for a job, 
however, they have some difficult in finding one.  
As expected, wages are positively and significantly correlated with educational 
attainment and show a significant inverted U-shape with age. But there are interesting 
differences between women and men in these results. According to the regression outputs, 
even when women have a higher marginal return to education, the gaps in the intercepts—
which are determined not only by non-observed characteristics but also by gender—imply 
lower female wages. 
5  SIMULATION RESULTS 
This section presents the results of our simulation methodology for the eight Latin American 
countries selected. As explained above, we simulate the elimination of four aspects of labour-
market gender inequalities to investigate their impacts on income distribution, in terms of 
average per capita income growth, and of poverty and inequality indicators. 
The first gender inequalities aspect to be removed is the difference in women’s and men’s 
probabilities of being economically active, conditional on their characteristics. If the effects of 18  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
the determinants of labour market participation were the same for men and women (that is, if 
women and men with the same characteristics had the same probability of being in the labour 
force), the rate of female participation in the labour force would increase in all the countries 
analysed. Table 5 shows that the rate of female economic activity would reach levels very close 
to the male rate, and would be even higher than the male rate in Chile.  
In this first simulation, the women who would enter the labour force are allocated to the 
occupational categories (unemployed, formal or informal workers) according to the actual 
estimated female occupational equation; the result is also presented in Table 5. Comparing that 
with Table 2, we can note that there would be a decline in the rate of female formality and an 
increase in the rate of female informality in all countries. Moreover, the female unemployment 
rate would rise in most countries. This is because the women who are excluded from the labour 
market have poorer characteristics than those who are already part of the labour force. For 
example, the previous section showed that inactive women have less education than active 
women. When they become economically active, therefore, they face poor conditions in the 
labour market and most of them are unable to work in formal occupations. 
After this step, we calculate the monthly wages that these women would receive in line 
with the actual female remuneration in the labour market. Table 5 presents the simulated ratio 
of the female-to-male monthly wage, which is smaller than the original in all countries. Again, 
this is because women outside the labour force have poorer characteristics. 
Figure 1 shows the effects that the increase in the female labour force would have on the 
income distribution. For all countries, this simulation implies income growth followed by a fall 
in the poverty and inequality indices. The growth of the average per capita income level would 
vary from 15 per cent in Mexico to 3.5 per cent in Uruguay. The incidence of poverty would fall 
most in Chile (34 per cent) and least in Uruguay (15 per cent). Additionally, there would be a 
notable narrowing of the poverty gap: 37 per cent in Chile and 20 per cent in Uruguay. This 
indicates that the benefits reach all the poor, particularly the most poor. Inequality would also 
fall, indicated by a decline of about 4 per cent in the Gini index. 
The second aspect of gender inequalities to be eliminated in our simulations consists  
of the gender differences in the probabilities of being in each occupational status—that is, 
women would have the same probability as men of being unemployed, formal or informal 
workers, given their characteristics. Table 6 shows that the female formality rate would 
increase and both the female informality rate and the female unemployment rate would 
decline in all countries except the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, El Salvador and Mexico. In the 
Dominican Republic, the female informality rate would rise from 40 per cent to 44 per cent; in 
Uruguay that rate would rise from 43 per cent to 45 per cent. In El Salvador, the female 
unemployment rate would increase from 4 per cent to 11 per cent; in Mexico, that rate would 
rise from 2 per cent to 5 per cent. Because of the improvement in the type of female 
occupations, the female-to-male monthly wage ratio would increase in all countries except 
one. The only country where this ratio would not rise is the Dominican Republic, where the rate 
of female informality would increase. In all the other countries, female formality would rise 
while female informality would decline, and thus women’s monthly wage would increase. 
The outcomes of the second simulation are income growth, less poverty and less 
inequality, as shown in Figure 2. The highest income growth (2.5 per cent) would be in Brazil. 
The most sizeable reduction in the incidence of poverty (8 per cent) would be in Brazil, the 
Dominican Republic and Uruguay. The most substantial narrowing of the poverty gap  
(12 per cent) would be in Brazil. The most marked decline in inequality (1.5 per cent) would be Working Paper  19 
 
in Argentina, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay. Compared to the first simulation, however, 
these figures are not impressive. It is important to note El Salvador, where poverty and 
inequality would increase and income would fall. This is because female unemployment would 
rise from 4 per cent to 11 per cent. In Mexico, where the outcome is positive but to the smallest 
degree among the countries studied, female unemployment would rise from 2 per cent to 5 
per cent. As mentioned earlier, in the Dominican Republic there would be an increase in 
female informality and a consequent decline in the average monthly wage for women.  
This would not have negative effects because the female unemployment rate would fall  
from 25 per cent to 11 per cent. 
The third facet of gender inequalities considered in our simulations is wage discrimination 
by gender, which is removed when women receive the same remuneration as men for their 
characteristics. A complete approach to this issue required that we do two different 
simulations: one considering the observed characteristics, which are the explanatory variables 
in the hourly wage equation; and another considering both observed and non-observed 
characteristics, which are present in the residuals term. The results are presented in Tables 7 
and 8, and in Figures 3 and 4; they do not differ very much. 
Tables 7 and 8 show that there would be an increase in the female-to-male hourly wage 
ratio. In some countries, such as Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay, this ratio would 
be even higher than 1, implying that women are more skilled than men in these countries.  
The female-to-male monthly wage ratio would also increase in all countries but it would not 
surpass 1 in any country because it also depends on the total hours worked, and women work 
fewer hours than men. As a result of the improvement in female remuneration on both 
observed and non-observed characteristics, income would grow in a range from 0.7 per cent in 
El Salvador to 8 per cent in Brazil. The fall in the poverty incidence would vary from 14 per cent 
in Paraguay to 3 per cent in Argentina and El Salvador, and the decline in the poverty gap would 
range from 12 per cent in Paraguay to 0.5 per cent in El Salvador. The Gini index would show 
small variations in all countries, either rising or falling. The results of eliminating gender wage 
discrimination thus represent important achievements in poverty reduction and income growth, 
though these results are not as notable as the results of increasing the female labour force. 
The fourth aspect of gender inequalities to be eliminated by simulations is the gender  
gap in characteristic endowments. Once more we consider two simulations, one for observed 
characteristics only, and another for both observed and non-observed characteristics. Tables 9 
and 10 show that equalising women’s and men’s characteristics would not significantly alter 
the female labour force and differences in occupational status. The female-to-male monthly 
wage ratio would tend to decline but not to a significant extent in most countries. Figures 5 
and 6 shows that these simulations do not produce significant outcomes for the countries 
analysed in terms of income growth, poverty and inequality. The simulation that considers 
only observed characteristics (Figure 5) would have a positive effect on poverty reduction but 
not as sizeable an impact as the previous simulations. In the other simulation (Figure 6), some 
of the impacts would even be negative (such as an increase in poverty or a fall in income) but 
not substantially so. These results confirm that the endowment gender gap is not a significant 
issue in these countries, because in some of them women might even have better 
characteristics, such as education. 20  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
TABLE 5 
Labour Market Characteristics, Without Gender Differences in the Probability of Participating in 
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Argentina, 2006  81.64  95.84  30.77  51.06  18.17  61.10 
Brazil, 2006  81.20  95.00  35.54  49.98  14.47  57.82 
Chile, 2003  81.21  101.09  36.47  48.10  15.43  55.99 
Dominican Republic, 2002  84.52  97.49  33.25  41.93  24.82  62.57 
El Salvador, 2004  80.66  97.52  37.15  58.32  4.37  72.01 
Mexico, 2006  87.23  99.17  42.70  55.36  1.94  59.00 
Paraguay, 2005  82.18  93.06  19.35  70.44  10.21  49.17 
Uruguay, 2004  82.68  95.27  20.10  45.54  20.10  59.09 
Source: authors’ calculations based on the respective national household surveys. 
 
FIGURE 1 
Impact on Income Growth, Poverty and Inequality,Without Gender Differences in the Probability 
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
 
TABLE 6 
Labour Market Characteristics, Without Gender Differences in the Probability of Being Formal, 
Informal or Unemployed 







Ratio of Female to 
Male Monthly 
Wage (%) 
Argentina,  2006  45.60 42.19 12.14 66.02 
Brazil,  2006  53.62  36.80 9.58 62.38 
Chile, 2003  55.98  31.42 12.60 60.80 
Dominican Republic, 2002  45.75  43.39  10.86  63.55 
El Salvador, 2004  51.14  37.59  11.26  76.32 
Mexico,  2006  56.14  38.63 5.23 62.71 
Paraguay,  2005  34.87  56.66 8.47 56.07 
Uruguay,  2004  46.90 45.47 12.23 61.56 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. Working Paper  21 
 
FIGURE 2 
Impact on Income Growth, Poverty and Inequality, Without Gender Differences in the Probability 
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
 
TABLE 7 
Labour Market Characteristics, Without Gender Wage Discrimination (Observed Characteristics) 
  Ratio of Female to Male  
Monthly Wage (%) 
Ratio of Female to Male  
Hourly Wage (%) 
Argentina, 2006  74.86  99.76 
Brazil, 2006  85.57  103.85 
Chile, 2003  80.40  99.13 
Dominican Republic, 2002  90.71  113.77 
El Salvador, 2004  76.92  91.72 
Mexico, 2006  77.09  102.09 
Paraguay, 2005  73.79  89.07 
Uruguay, 2004  81.65  114.10 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
 
FIGURE 3 
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
 22  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
TABLE 8 
Labour Market Characteristics, Without Gender Wage Discrimination  
(Observed and Non-Observed Characteristics) 
  
Ratio of Female to Male  
Monthly Wage (%) 
Ratio of Female to Male  
Hourly Wage (%) 
Argentina, 2006  74.49 98.88 
Brazil, 2006  85.44 103.39 
Chile, 2003  82.44 103.22 
Dominican Republic, 2002  87.88 107.60 
El Salvador, 2004  77.83 97.25 
Mexico, 2006  72.35 92.88 
Paraguay, 2005  73.44 87.38 
Uruguay, 2004  81.35 112.41 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
 
FIGURE 4 
Impact on Income Growth, Poverty and Inequality, Without Gender Wage Discrimination 













Argentina - 2006 Brazil - 2006 Chile - 2003
Dominican Republic - 2002 El Salvador - 2004 Mexico - 2006
Paraguay - 2005 Uruguay - 2004
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
 
TABLE 9 
























Argentina, 2006  55.92  65.65  30.47  53.20  16.33  55.88 
Brazil, 2006  62.68  73.33  35.10  52.19  12.71  55.87 
Chile, 2003  48.64  60.55  36.75  48.30  14.95  56.70 
Dominican Republic, 2002  60.99  70.35  35.62  44.56  19.82  60.84 
El Salvador, 2004  58.28  70.46  41.87  53.76  4.38  72.66 
Mexico, 2006  53.69  61.04  42.72  55.48  1.81  57.84 
Paraguay, 2005  63.85  72.30  24.01  66.90  9.09  51.41 
Uruguay, 2004  64.80  74.66  35.69  47.25  17.06  55.13 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
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FIGURE 5 
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
 
TABLE 10 



























Argentina, 2006  55.92  65.65  30.47  53.20  16.33  58.07 
Brazil, 2006  62.68  73.33  35.10  52.19  12.71  56.69 
Chile, 2003  48.64  60.55  36.75  48.30  14.95  60.02 
Dominican Republic, 2002  60.99  70.35  35.62  44.56  19.82  60.12 
El Salvador, 2004  58.28  70.46  41.87  53.76  4.38  74.53 
Mexico, 2006  53.69  61.04  42.72  55.48  1.81  62.75 
Paraguay, 2005  63.85  72.30  24.01  66.90  0.91  53.55 
Uruguay, 2004  64.80  74.66  35.69  47.25  17.06  55.80 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
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6  CONCLUSION 
This paper has investigated the hypothesis that gender inequalities may have implications for 
society as a whole in terms of household income growth and levels of poverty and inequality. 
Considering four aspects of gender inequalities, we simulated labour market features in order 
to obtain counterfactual household income distributions. The decomposition methodology 
used here does not consider general equilibrium effects, and thus the results must be analysed 
carefully. Our empirical findings correspond to a rough estimate of what would happen  
if there were no specific aspect of gender inequalities. Moreover, they do comprise important 
evidence about the direction in which the indicators would move in each simulation, and they 
do allow us to compare the simulations in order to highlight which aspect of gender 
inequalities have more significant effects. 
The four aspects of gender inequalities considered are: different rates of economic 
activity, differences in occupational status, wage discrimination and the gap in characteristic 
endowments. We simulated the elimination of each of these in isolation. Our findings show 
that gender inequalities are significant not only for women but for everybody in society, 
especially the poor. The eradication of gender inequalities would result in a rise in household 
income and a decline in poverty and inequality. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that these 
results may vary among countries and according to each aspect of gender inequality being 
considered. For instance, equalising the probabilities of men and women being in each 
occupational status (unemployed, formal and informal worker) would have positive outcomes 
except in El Salvador, where income would fall and poverty would rise. This is because women 
in El Salvador have a lower probability of being unemployed than men, and so in this respect 
women are better placed than men even though they suffer other kinds of adversity  
(they are more likely to informal and be economically inactive). 
Despite the foregoing observation, some general conclusions can be drawn. Overall, 
equalising characteristic endowments among men and women would not have significant 
results in any of the eight countries analysed. Equalising men’s and women’s probabilities of 
being in each occupational status would promote poverty reduction and a rise in income  
in all countries except one, though the scale of the change would be less than that resulting 
from the elimination of gender wage discrimination in most countries. The most impressive 
results for all countries analysed are from the simulation that equalises women’s and men’s 
probabilities of being economically active. The increase in female labour participation  
would lead to significant reduction in poverty, growth in income and decline in inequality. 
In these eight Latin American countries, the aspect of gender equalities that has the 
potential to bring about substantial improvement in the indicators—in terms of income, 
poverty and inequality—would be an increase in women’s labour market participation.  
In these countries, the promotion of women’s participation in the labour force deserves special 
attention in public policies. It must be noted, however, that not any increase in the female 
labour force will have this result. As mentioned earlier, Scorzafave (2004) and Bourguignon et al. 
(2001) found that the recent increase in the female labour force had an inequality-increasing Working Paper  25 
 
effect in Brazil and Taiwan, respectively. The reason is that women who entered the labour 
market were mostly from the upper part of the distribution. Hence, in order to ensure that an 
increase in the female labour force has the potential to reduce poverty and inequality, it is 
important to guarantee that poor women become economically active. Improving women’s 
(particularly poor women’s) access to the labour market is an important challenge that public 
policies should tackle. Since children negatively affect the probability of women being 
economically active, an important means of increasing female participation might be to 






















Urban Population  23,522,846  155,933,826  13,595,542 5,564,575  4,031,882 80,822,562 3,383,530  2,364,322 
Gini Index  0.4875  0.5514 0.5582 0.6132 0.4687 0.5210 0.5048 0.4618 
Poverty Incidence (%)  20.08  19.88 19.99 19.97 19.97 19.96 19.96 19.99 
Poverty Gap  (%)  8.50 7.83  7.06  8.30  8.75  10.19 7.16  6.48 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
 
TABLE A2 
Impact on Income Growth, Poverty and Inequality, Without Gender Differences in the Probability 



















Income Growth (%)  7.57 6.19 10.15 4.66  9.89 14.92 4.67  3.69 
Poverty Incidence Change (%)  -18.58  -19.77 -33.96 -17.80 -29.34 -25.36 -17.31 -14.98 
Poverty Gap Change (%)  -23.12  -27.18 -36.85 -23.72 -31.91 -27.74 -22.42 -19.95 
Gini Index Change (%)  -3.80 -2.97  -5.86 -2.85 -6.42 -4.87 -2.97 -2.83 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
 
TABLE A3 
Impact on Income Growth, Poverty and Inequality, Without Gender Differences in the Probability 



















Income Growth (%)  2.07 2.58  0.76  1.65  -1.50  0.34  2.13  1.21 
Poverty Incidence Change (%)  -5.72 -7.75  -4.10 -8.46 4.69 -1.19 -4.79 -7.65 
Poverty Gap Change  (%)  -7.44 -12.20  -4.27 -9.71 6.00 -1.83 -5.96 -9.12 
Gini Index Change (%)  -1.50 -1.12  -0.71 -1.49 0.65 -0.61 -0.69 -1.46 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
 
TABLE A4 




















Income Growth (%)  2.84  8.05 5.62 4.63 0.70 6.90 7.38 4.06 
Poverty Incidence Change (%)  -2.71 -9.05  -6.23 -9.55 -1.40 -8.55 -11.33  -4.88 
Poverty Gap Change (%)  -2.74 -11.76  -6.58 -9.21 -0.70 -8.26 -11.98  -5.18 
Gini Index Change (%)  0.35 0.28  0.18 -1.23 -0.16 -1.22 -0.85 0.72 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. Working Paper  27 
 
TABLE A5 
Impact on Income Growth, Poverty and Inequality, Without Gender Wage Discrimination 



















Income Growth (%)  2.76 8.01  6.19  4.09  1.03  4.99  7.26  4.00 
Poverty Incidence Change (%)  -2.75 -9.07  -6.17 -9.26 -1.17 -7.86 -13.71  -4.72 
Poverty Gap Change (%)  -2.81 -11.82  -6.37  -10.36  -0.51  -8.73  -12.02  -5.27 
Gini Index Change (%)  0.29 0.27  0.58  -1.41 0.04 -1.77 -0.69 0.70 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
 
TABLE A6 




















Income Growth (%)  -0.86 0.75  -0.38  0.30  -0.08 -0.57  0.99  -0.13 
Poverty Incidence Change (%)  -0.24 -2.23  0.01 -3.05  -1.91 0.31 -3.03  -3.05 
Poverty Gap Change (%)  -1.69 -7.24  -1.33 -6.92 -3.19 -0.48 -4.98 -4.42 
Gini Index Change (%)  -0.56 -0.35  -0.28 -0.68 -1.05 0.14 -0.09 -0.83 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
 
TABLE A7 




















Income Growth (%)  -0.39  0.97 0.58 0.15 0.62 1.44 1.70 0.02 
Poverty Incidence Change (%)  -0.57 -1.25  -0.38 -3.69 -1.97 2.47 -3.52 -3.29 
Poverty Gap Change (%)  -2.28 -6.55  -1.39 -7.22 -3.38 0.42 -5.79 -4.80 
Gini Index Change (%)  -0.13  -0.14 0.59 -0.84 0.27 2.43 0.81 -0.66 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 28  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
TABLE A8 
Argentina’s Regressions: Participation-Occupational Model 













Primary Incomplete  0.64528  1.11908  -0.79865  0.1234759  -0.00621  0.0690121 
 (0.22628)**  (0.31014)**  (0.652)  (0.5294256)  (0.51044)  (0.4293894) 
Primary Complete  0.69225  1.35081  -0.57593  0.1317831  0.51659  0.2101684 
 (0.21575)**  (0.29050)**  (0.61961)  (0.5050495)  (0.49339)  (0.4141348) 
Secondary Incomplete  0.96371  1.5289  -0.6469  -0.0996294  0.44105  0.1644754 
 (0.21736)**  (0.29240)**  (0.62056)  (0.5075626)  (0.49355)  (0.4148718) 
Secondary Complete  1.17594  1.66853  0.1783  -0.1860065  0.70503  0.1542799 
 (0.21594)**  (0.28988)**  (0.618)  (0.5069364)  (0.49223)  (0.4142842) 
Superior 2.05933  2.29795  0.88041  -0.3980545  1.37542  0.168788 
 (0.22439)**  (0.31396)**  (0.62373)  (0.5159938)  (0.51293)**  (0.4401262) 
Age 0.25685  0.31637  0.18233  0.1139427  0.1806  0.1602874 
 (0.01218)**  (0.01889)**  (0.02408)**  (0.0214244)***  (0.02267)**  (0.0221542)*** 
Age Squared  -0.00335  -0.00433  -0.00213  -0.000991  -0.00236  -0.0018071 
 (0.00015)**  (0.00023)**  (0.00031)**  (0.0002714)***  (0.00028)**  (0.0002735)*** 
Married -1.06832  1.20315  0.12377  0.1499534  1.01402  0.6702469 
 (0.05099)**  (0.09546)**  (0.09571)  (0.0887062)*  (0.10159)**  (0.1006202)*** 
Region NOA  -0.62988  -0.82299  -0.05219  0.3241525  -0.32038  0.0598854 
 (0.05043)**  (0.08482)**  (0.10069)  (0.0905659)***  (0.09079)**  (0.0898848) 
Region NEA  -1.15184  -1.51073  0.25292  0.934432  -0.42761  0.2781925 
 (0.06056)**  (0.09628)**  (0.15206)*  (0.133709)***  (0.12090)**  (0.116999)** 
Region Cuyo  -0.45574  -0.45111  0.56181  0.6811973  0.1465  0.3866473 
 (0.05984)**  (0.09830)**  (0.12607)**  (0.1196462)***  (0.11758)  (0.1164616)*** 
Region Pampeana  -0.35154  -0.65552  -0.26066  0.1760346  -0.10809  0.2735046 
 (0.04553)**  (0.07838)**  (0.08525)**  (0.0805475)**  (0.08612)  (0.0854475)*** 
Region Patagonia  -0.47852  -0.76143  0.06746  0.2226627  -0.24821  -0.0623211 
 (0.07887)**  (0.12482)**  (0.18942)  (0.1707224  (0.15339)  (0.1563629) 
Ln (Non-labour income)  -0.27977  -0.53673  -0.68537  -0.4824928  -0.44478  -0.3417406 
 (0.05115)**  (0.07643)**  (0.08858)**  (0.0854417)***  (0.08052)**  (0.080016)*** 
Ln (Non-labour income) Squared  -0.00081  0.0309  0.089  0.0499846  0.051  0.0266702 
 (0.00634)  (0.00965)**  (0.01250)**  (0.0121797)***  (0.01217)**  (0.0121041)** 
No. of Children 0-3 Years Old  -0.36614  0.6494  -0.20265  -0.2408007  0.14423  0.361782 
 (0.05850)**  (0.15882)**  (0.11542)*  (0.1075358)**  (0.12842)  (0.1259677)*** 
No. of Children 4-6 Years Old   -0.39673  0.10183  -0.14781  0.0018889  -0.05536  -0.1351171 
 (0.05277)**  (0.12149)  (0.10817)  (0.0965199)  (0.11367)  (0.1131932) 
No. of Girls 7-10 Years Old  -0.24742  -0.16959  0.04271  -0.025951  -0.23743  -0.0788782 
 (0.06057)**  (0.12293)  (0.13713)  (0.1295019)  (0.15438)  (0.1505272) 
No. of Girls 11-15 Years Old  -0.18987  0.06067  -0.2441  -0.1352547  0.13953  0.0686593 
 (0.04817)**  (0.08421)  (0.09976)**  (0.0883877)  (0.10106)  (0.0952565) 
No. of Boys 7-10 Years Old   -0.23413  -0.11926  -0.17337  -0.0182642  -0.04226  -0.0213394 
 (0.05792)**  (0.13723)  (0.13901)  (0.1159348)  (0.12254)  (0.1182029) 
No. of Boys 11-15 Years Old   -0.14861  0.01396  0.0432  0.077128  0.05381  0.0194247 
 (0.04526)**  (0.07917)  (0.09809)  (0.0865542)  (0.09001)  (0.0883462) 
School Attendance   -0.87026  -1.85253  -0.16044  -0.496687  -0.14344  -0.393509 
 (0.06850)**  (0.08636)**  (0.12281)  (0.119967)***  (0.12474)  (0.1306822)*** 
Elderly -0.38194  -0.04657  -0.12504  -0.1064661  -0.0064  0.0454345 
 (0.04237)**  (0.07495)  (0.08378)  (0.0772064)  (0.0771)  (0.0769673) 
No. of Unemployed  0.03607  0.12767  -0.44391  -0.4694187  -0.59026  -0.5792049 
 (0.04923)  (0.07948)  (0.09913)**  (0.0784995)***  (0.07859)**  (0.0747836)*** 
 No. of Informal  0.18012  0.36027  -0.03808  0.3500285  -0.14145  0.3529733 
 (0.02601)**  (0.04115)**  (0.06093)  (0.0535176)***  (0.06008)**  (0.0602751)*** 
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Constant -2.49613  -2.62793  -1.77132  -0.7170147  -1.75057  -1.476776 
   (0.32355)**  (0.48274)**  (0.75359)**  (0.6410007)  (0.63926)**  (0.5677066)*** 
Observations 21941  18980  10824  15554 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.1486  0.3252  0.1213  0.0827 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level. 
Gran Buenos Aires is the base category.  
Unemployed is the occupational equation base category. 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
 
TABLE A9  
Argentina’s Regressions: Wage Model 
  Monthly Wage  Hourly Wage 


















Primary  Incomplete  -0.10571 -0.00956 0.08672  0.01086  -0.22223 -0.03365 0.1348  0.06686 
  (0.27699) (0.16838) (0.15541) (0.11297) (0.1672)  (0.12384) (0.15872) (0.10596) 
Primary  Complete  0.18113 0.14926 0.29968 0.24415 -0.18566  0.19337 0.29687 0.14259 
  (0.26049) (0.16199) (0.15141)*  (0.10620)*  (0.14865) (0.11535) (0.15392) (0.09797) 
Secondary  0.30715 0.28576 0.44871 0.45572 -0.04045  0.26029 0.47249 0.25883 
  (0.26251)  (0.1637) (0.15193)**  (0.10678)**  (0.1494) (0.11682)*  (0.15443)**  (0.09849)** 
Secondary  Complete  0.70981 0.61718 0.67143 0.66572 0.32639 0.39712 0.72815 0.4949 
  (0.25889)** (0.16282)** (0.15116)** (0.10605)** (0.14467)*  (0.11588)** (0.15375)** (0.09806)** 
Superior  0.95139 1.24179 0.9925  1.30919 0.74321 0.88314 1.18587 1.07253 
  (0.25969)** (0.16808)** (0.15275)** (0.11347)** (0.14643)** (0.12390)** (0.15619)** (0.10819)** 
Age  0.05421 0.03167 0.08379 0.09207 0.04021 0.03864 0.05892 0.04624 
  (0.00922)** (0.00807)** (0.00608)** (0.00665)** (0.00845)** (0.00758)** (0.00647)** (0.00671)** 
Age  Squared  -0.00051 -0.00031 -0.00085 -0.00097 -0.00037 -0.0004  -0.00056 -0.00042 
  (0.00012)** (0.00010)** (0.00008)** (0.00008)** (0.00011)** (0.00009)** (0.00008)** (0.00008)** 
Region  NOA  -0.43305 -0.35684 -0.35049 -0.47604 -0.31329 -0.58876 -0.3554  -0.49461 
  (0.03975)** (0.03485)** (0.02390)** (0.02946)** (0.03579)** (0.03323)** (0.02391)** (0.02906)** 
Region  NEA  -0.45187 -0.30381 -0.38721 -0.45762 -0.39332 -0.58593 -0.39643 -0.53181 
  (0.05575)** (0.04118)** (0.03431)** (0.03332)** (0.04855)** (0.03903)** (0.03359)** (0.03301)** 
Region  Cuyo  -0.19018 -0.30083 -0.14678 -0.21897 -0.16824 -0.37593 -0.19518 -0.24693 
  (0.03793)** (0.04370)** (0.02712)** (0.03442)** (0.03781)** (0.04104)** (0.02769)** (0.03410)** 
Region  Pampeana  -0.10562 -0.03331 -0.09609 -0.06126 -0.0457  -0.1061  -0.07785 -0.06116 
  (0.02970)** (0.03288)  (0.01932)** (0.02669)*  (0.02926)  (0.03051)** (0.02051)** (0.02633)* 
Region  Patagonia  0.40134 0.29213 0.31626 0.16934 0.30122 0.29041 0.27346 0.11864 
  (0.05059)** (0.05665)** (0.03567)** (0.05786)** (0.04597)** (0.05736)** (0.03871)** (0.06273 
Constant  4.77097 4.67229 4.55788 4.00393 0.36542 0.01293 -0.30927  -0.13568 
    (0.29505)** (0.22369)** (0.18353)** (0.16009)** (0.20461)    (0.17994)  (0.18646)  (0.15678) 
Observations 3355 5557 6469 7046 3075 5415 6118 6867 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.22412 0.16719 0.28106 0.22335 0.26624 0.14765 0.30413 0.17913 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level. 
Gran Buenos Aires is the base category.  
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 30  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
TABLE A10 
Brazil’s Regressions: Participation-Occupational Model 













Primary  Incomplete  0.63972 0.83414 0.42474 0.0763031  0.43728 0.3068537 
  (0.03477)** (0.04418)** (0.10123)** (0.0800596)  (0.07838)** (0.0752814)*** 
 Primary Complete  0.94794  1.25414  0.78853  0.0594064  0.68964  0.1977858 
  (0.04114)** (0.05697)** (0.10907)** (0.0894409)  (0.08811)** (0.0861555)** 
Secondary  Incomplete  1.10921 1.39647 0.71786 -0.1449484  0.67679 0.2520903 
  (0.04428)** (0.06048)** (0.10912)** (0.0892916)  (0.09042)** (0.0889297)*** 
Secondary Complete  1.45113  1.74148  1.23893  -0.207144  0.9732  0.0823695 
  (0.03792)** (0.05169)** (0.10214)** (0.0827529)**  (0.08208)** (0.0799627) 
University  1.93623 2.17172 1.62761 -0.634117  1.38291 0.1067949 
  (0.04618)** (0.06312)** (0.11037)** (0.0951025)***  (0.09772)** (0.0980128) 
Age  0.18141 0.19376 0.13408 0.1171487  0.15061 0.1439834 
  (0.00491)** (0.00675)** (0.01031)** (0.0096815)***  (0.01009)** (0.0101854)*** 
Age Squared  -0.00265  -0.00295  -0.0014  -0.0007883  -0.00192  -0.0014369 
  (0.00006)** (0.00008)** (0.00014)** (0.0001304)***  (0.00013)** (0.0001312)*** 
Race  -0.0304  0.04841 0.21316 0.1222424  0.10156 0.1998885 
  (0.01793)*  (0.02755)*  (0.03355)** (0.0324896)***  (0.03641)** (0.0372023)*** 
Married  -0.38524  0.89719 0.04373 0.2147332  0.88182 0.7263584 
 (0.01889)**  (0.03656)**  -0.03685  (0.0352801)***  (0.04763)**  (0.0482774)*** 
Region  Northeast  0.05455  -0.15384 -0.11507 -0.1910401  -0.53945 -0.4775738 
 (0.02702)*  (0.04079)**  (0.05314)*  (0.0490714)***  (0.05524)**  (0.0554658)*** 
Region Southeast  0.56809  0.28333  0.21608  -0.3098367  -0.03759  -0.5744651 
 (0.02700)**  (0.04097)**  (0.05252)**  (0.0494331)***  (0.05571)  (0.0564084)*** 
Region  South  0.66834 0.37564 0.68089 -0.0153659  0.18791 -0.2539304 
  (0.03186)** (0.04819)** (0.06263)** (0.060346)  (0.06762)** (0.0685852)*** 
Region Center  0.34683  0.31604  0.18143  -0.0289766  -0.08178  -0.2982315 
 (0.03161)**  (0.04963)**  (0.06205)**  (0.0583476)  (0.0663)  (0.0669916)*** 
Ln (Non-labour income)  -0.24788  -0.27534  -0.44473  -0.411034  -0.33298  -0.4100158 
  (0.02165)** (0.02904)** (0.03482)** (0.0347882)***  (0.03123)** (0.032104)*** 
Ln (Non-labour income) Squared  -0.01422  -0.02342  0.04586  0.030058  0.02601  0.0312019 
  (0.00246)** (0.00335)** (0.00442)** (0.004485)***  (0.00441)** (0.0045954)*** 
No. of Children 0-3 Years Old  -0.55166  0.11926  -0.27574  -0.2469285  -0.09456  -0.0485416 
 (0.02012)**  (0.05446)*  (0.03787)**  (0.0352284)***  (0.04954)*  (0.0500375) 
No. of Children 4-6 Years Old   -0.27708  0.13258  -0.13564  -0.0622517  -0.1529  -0.1195465 
  (0.02153)** (0.05840)*  (0.04203)** (0.0395169)  (0.05919)** (0.0597212)** 
No. of Girls 7-10 Years Old  -0.12812  0.05727  -0.1895  -0.1268238  -0.00961  -0.0017394 
 (0.02530)**  (0.06413)  (0.04996)**  (0.0457784)***  (0.06664)  (0.0671713) 
No. of Girls 11-15 Years Old  -0.02707  -0.01191  0.02138  0.101919  0.01124  -0.0337453 
  (0.0228)  (0.04907) (0.04898) (0.0449719)**  (0.06467) (0.0651418) 
No. of Boys 7-10 Years Old   -0.16579  0.07942  -0.15402  -0.0656588  -0.03496  -0.0325368 
 (0.02479)**  (0.06188)  (0.04960)**  (0.045744)  (0.06416)  (0.0645825) 
No. of Boys 11-15 Years Old   -0.09654  -0.05017  -0.13773  -0.0826975  -0.05992  -0.1120081 
 (0.02249)**  (0.04778)  (0.04685)**  (0.0426081)*  (0.05765)  (0.0579989)* 
School Attendance   -0.25795  -0.83308  -0.20769  -0.2054539  -0.34484  -0.4954833 
  (0.02772)** (0.03690)** (0.04609)** (0.0458793)***  (0.04907)** (0.0528177)*** 
Elderly  -0.1733  -0.14893 -0.14836 -0.103979  -0.22508 -0.0637099 
  (0.02147)** (0.02810)** (0.04019)** (0.0390296)***  (0.03911)** (0.0397401) 
No. of Unemployed  0.00142  -0.0145  -0.57524  -0.6840627  -0.60757  -0.7127421 
  (0.01835)  (0.02692)  (0.03079)** (0.0294351)***  (0.02761)** (0.0293982)*** 
No. of Informal  0.16462  0.27448  -0.12644  0.3198156  0.03385  0.4353771 
 (0.01155)**  (0.01760)**  (0.02315)**  (0.0212417)***  (0.0236)  (0.0235921)*** 
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Constant  -1.51833 -0.54834 -1.80017 -0.2719818  -0.77223 -0.5732925 
    (0.11027)** (0.15139)** (0.21719)** (0.2006025)  (0.20275)** (0.2048217)*** 
Observations 95055  82688  56534  70457 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.1308  0.2179  0.1269  0.0906 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level. 
Region North is the base category. 
Unemployed is the occupational equation base category. 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
 
TABLE A11 
Brazil’s Regressions: Wage Model 
  Monthly Wage  Hourly Wage 


















Primary  Incomplete  0.19188 0.32246 0.24111 0.40743 0.17497 0.24874 0.22284 0.34479 
  (0.04046)** (0.02427)** (0.01776)** (0.02051)** (0.04256)** (0.02252)** (0.01794)** (0.01935)** 
  Primary  Complete  0.35772 0.57429 0.43189 0.61445 0.32786 0.43613 0.42512 0.52609 
  (0.04222)** (0.02722)** (0.01918)** (0.02392)** (0.04430)** (0.02554)** (0.01950)** (0.02276)** 
Secondary  0.47888 0.58929 0.46779 0.67928 0.47393 0.47119 0.48046 0.61816 
  (0.04253)** (0.02945)** (0.01987)** (0.02583)** (0.04464)** (0.02742)** (0.02041)** (0.02492)** 
Secondary  0.63189 0.83705 0.66613 0.91675 0.62498 0.686  0.67378 0.84363 
  (0.04036)** (0.02584)** (0.01826)** (0.02254)** (0.04263)** (0.02400)** (0.01840)** (0.02158)** 
University  1.23851 1.41344 1.35705 1.44145 1.36478 1.25853 1.45421 1.45464 
  (0.04123)** (0.03411)** (0.02059)** (0.02943)** (0.04347)** (0.03260)** (0.02070)** (0.02898)** 
Age  0.06459 0.0744  0.08292 0.10184 0.0524  0.06411 0.07205 0.08139 
  (0.00323)** (0.00304)** (0.00220)** (0.00268)** (0.00314)** (0.00286)** (0.00224)** (0.00265)** 
Age  Squared  -0.00066 -0.00081 -0.00078 -0.00108 -0.00046 -0.00065 -0.00065 -0.00083 
  (0.00005)** (0.00004)** (0.00003)** (0.00003)** (0.00004)** (0.00004)** (0.00003)** (0.00003)** 
Race  0.16511 0.13502 0.16353 0.21065 0.16431 0.11317 0.16089 0.18228 
  (0.00959)** (0.01125)** (0.00694)** (0.01045)** (0.00985)** (0.01069)** (0.00732)** (0.01034)** 
Region  Northeast -0.12545 -0.34846 -0.16053 -0.24266 -0.09772 -0.30619 -0.15547 -0.21195 
  (0.01801)** (0.01781)** (0.01201)** (0.01490)** (0.01811)** (0.01726)** (0.01280)** (0.01483)** 
Region  Southeast  0.14761 0.1177  0.12992 0.12907 0.13119 0.1333  0.11536 0.12316 
  (0.01611)** (0.01662)** (0.01097)** (0.01468)** (0.01605)** (0.01619)** (0.01174)** (0.01458)** 
Region  South  0.08479 0.10541 0.09799 0.14169 0.07625 0.13986 0.08977 0.14391 
  (0.01772)** (0.02019)** (0.01276)** (0.01784)** (0.01773)** (0.01879)** (0.01356)** (0.01780)** 
Region  Center  0.1257  0.15427 0.11179 0.20365 0.12965 0.149  0.09899 0.18419 
  (0.01920)** (0.01914)** (0.01324)** (0.01697)** (0.01954)** (0.01854)** (0.01400)** (0.01723)** 
Constant  4.1829  3.55886 4.06755 3.43251 -0.80067  -1.11528  -0.96974  -1.33497 
    (0.06757)** (0.06068)** (0.04184)** (0.05332)** (0.06822)** (0.05745)** (0.04271)** (0.05265)** 
Observations  21186 27860 36827 28889 21178 27844 36809 28858 
Adjusted R- 0.37133 0.24212 0.45062 0.3233  0.41494 0.22877 0.44711 0.30285 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level. 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 32  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
TABLE A12 
Chile’s Regressions: Participation-Occupational Model 













Primary Incomplete 0.92677  1.74111 -0.37682 -0.4566054 0.59794  0.0658342
 (0.14040)**  (0.16286)** (0.44051 (0.3677269) (0.32232)*  (0.3076001)
 Primary Complete 1.11864  2.18007 -0.12331 -0.0793651 1.01467  0.3501055
 (0.14224)**  (0.16345)** (0.43939) (0.3669825) (0.32669)**  (0.3121475)
Secondary Incomplete 1.25611 2.41796 0.14444 -0.4211394 1.08074  0.2079574
 (0.14013)**  (0.15617)** (0.43129) (0.3621777) (0.31929)**  (0.3050712)
Secondary Complete 1.63102  2.54053 0.63093 -0.726915 1.46605  0.4006384
 (0.13834)**  (0.15172)** (0.42732( (0.35917)** (0.31614)**  (0.3022595)
University 2.43167  2.92682 1.11411 -1.144122 1.81623  0.1700433
 (0.14523)**  (0.15947)** (0.43286)** (0.3669532)*** (0.32134)**  (0.3093977)
Age 0.22074  0.36886 0.16067 0.164506 0.14795  0.1892877
 (0.01032)**  (0.01498)** (0.02189)** (0.0212783)*** (0.01713)**  (0.0181562)***
Age Squared -0.00295  -0.00488 -0.00189 -0.0014825 -0.00179  -0.0019197
 (0.00013)**  (0.00018)** (0.00029)** (0.0002728)*** (0.00021)**  (0.0002227)***
Race -0.29427  0.04988 0.11434 -0.0060136 0.20043  0.1592818
 (0.08801)**  (0.13814) (0.18321) (0.1553123) (0.15149)  (0.1562656)
Married -0.99012  1.07193 0.10205 0.3286587 0.78076  0.6887013
 (0.04105)**  (0.07941)** (0.08466 (0.082062)*** (0.08622)**  (0.090604)***
Region II  -0.11922  0.07313 0.27509 0.0940226 0.26307  -0.1542202
 (0.13638)  (0.23241) (0.29184) (0.2675022) (0.24983)  (0.2637716)
Region III  0.02986  -0.01279 -0.15316 -0.3603483 -0.04124  -0.3622899
 (0.13803)  (0.22357) (0.2897) (0.2653827) (0.25598)  (0.2728751)
Region IV  -0.13422  -0.09055 0.29171 0.0115266 -0.34157  -0.4388102
 ((0.1208)  (0.20331) (0.26627) (0.2426663) (0.23221)  (0.2342292)*
Region V  0.07298  -0.05877 -0.20233 -0.2547907 -0.36605  -0.5092359
 (0.10713)  (0.18206) (0.23654) (0.2046324) (0.19943)*  (0.2048412)**
Region VI  -0.06436  0.04606 0.42901 -0.1382542 0.17572  -0.2107202
 (0.11731)  (0.19189) (0.25627)* (0.2290354) (0.22274)  (0.2274464)
Region VII  0.07023  0.10826 0.06176 -0.33493 0.01743  -0.05386
 (0.11398  (0.18749) (0.23962) (0.2094582) (0.22157)  (0.2269608)
Region VIII  -0.1957  -0.48291 0.18096 -0.0365913 -0.29158  -0.7036608
 (0.10466)*  (0.17484)** (0.22485) (0.194929) (0.19073)  (0.1964606)***
Region IX  -0.10456  -0.25491 0.1703 -0.0709636 -0.43354  -0.578054
 (0.1305)  (0.1894) (0.2761) (0.2355081) (0.20678)*  (0.213119)***
Region X  0.12028  -0.05205 0.36704 0.0282763 -0.16316  -0.2312644
 (0.11196)  (0.18127) (0.24298) (0.2109447) (0.21604)  (0.216817)
Region XI  0.52513  0.3247 0.62752 -0.0499069 -0.09946  0.0512288
 (0.15912)**  (0.24189 (0.33852)* (0.3167476) (0.30011)  (0.2967396)
Region XII  0.27706  -0.08164 0.29714 -0.3005203 0.8867  0.7456728
 (0.17813)  (0.30692) (0.38094) (0.3681784) (0.39675)*  (0.4106887)*
Region XIII  0.45634  0.52685 0.72776 -0.0692062 0.27069  -0.3573001
 (0.09912)**  (0.16718)** (0.21313)** (0.1849414) (0.18478)  (0.1891266)*
Ln (Non-labour income)  -0.0895  0.0568 -0.30241 -0.3599321 0.11561  0.0224832
 (0.03199)**  (0.04852 (0.06226)** (0.0602289)*** (0.03725)**  (0.0386292)
Ln (Non-labour income)  -0.00786  -0.01923 0.01916 0.0144786 -0.01244  -0.0073989
 (0.00216)**  (0.00317)** (0.00417)** (0.004003)*** (0.00289)**  (0.003051)**
No. of Children 0-3 Years Old  -0.51693  0.15374 -0.0031 -0.0774618 -0.07029  -0.1146455
 (0.04319)**  (0.09856) (0.08245) (0.085245) (0.08796)  (0.0905386)
No. of Children 4-6 Years Old   -0.27263  0.17524 -0.02359 -0.0001748 -0.18205  -0.1058462
 (0.04409)**  (0.11282) (0.08823) (0.0859915) (0.10339)*  (0.1066673)
No. of Girls 7-10 Years Old  -0.31165  -0.06207 -0.24606 -0.1157656 -0.12109  -0.0558252
 (0.05002)**  (0.10854 (0.10900)* (0.1099173) (0.10694)  (0.1106516)
No. of Girls 11-15 Years Old  -0.21472  -0.19844 0.02019 -0.000992 -0.18477  -0.1218041
 (0.04432)**  (0.07414)** (0.08834 (0.0856318) (0.08173)*  (0.0842954)
No. of Boys 7-10 Years Old   -0.36783  -0.02631 -0.08088 -0.1045109 -0.24483  -0.1828312
 (0.04918)**  (0.09559) (0.10015) (0.0950938) (0.10880)*  (0.1091449)*
No. of Boys 11-15 Years Old   -0.22398  -0.00749 -0.14672 -0.0960427 -0.02963  -0.0069538
 (0.04395)**  (0.08152) (0.09096) (0.0784691) (0.07908)  (0.0819812)
School Attendance   -2.17853  -2.74529 -0.13211 -0.0636965 -0.11026  0.0753095
 (0.08779)**  (0.08694)** (0.15081) (0.1658616) (0.15182)  (0.1759152)
Elderly -0.08791  -0.27669 0.07058 0.0531418 -0.32238  -0.2011822
 (0.03545)**  (0.05414)** (0.07095) (0.073765) (0.06182)**  (0.0645438)***
No. of Unemployed 0.08273  0.04181 -0.61181 -0.8550238 -0.69463  -0.7600859
 (0.03830)*  (0.05917) (0.06465)** (0.071251)*** (0.05213)**  (0.0596146)***
No. of Informal  0.22673  0.22116 -0.16793 0.3774571 -0.03487  0.4916539
 (0.02573)**  (0.04075)** (0.06267)** (0.0579836)*** (0.04905)  (0.0492434)***
Constant -2.29479  -5.35273 -2.13267 -0.0772418 -2.59315  -2.865178
   (0.28937)**  (0.41996)** (0.68753)** (0.6344497) (0.50544)**  (0.5152818)***
Observations 43520  33737 18049 26700
Adjusted R-Squared 0.1576  0.4139 0.1548 0.086
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level. 
Region I is the base category. 
Unemployed is the occupational equation base category. 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. Working Paper  33 
 
TABLE A13 
Chile’s Regressions: Wage Model 
  Monthly Wage  Hourly Wage 


















Primary  Incomplete  -0.02848  0.23117 0.31505 0.28039 -0.13047  0.22526 0.32612 0.22256 
  (0.18372 (0.09063)* (0.09873)**  (0.11292)* (0.15483)  (0.08409)**  (0.08171)**  (0.11803) 
  Primary  Complete  -0.03511  0.38579 0.47613 0.52274 -0.11934  0.35497 0.48495 0.33265 
  (0.18601 (0.09184)** (0.10079)** (0.11316)** (0.15514)  (0.08508)** (0.08495)** (0.11849)** 
Secondary  Incomplete  0.15827  0.47831 0.54953 0.60321 0.05853 0.39443 0.54388 0.41761 
  (0.18311 (0.09174)** (0.09744)** (0.11283)** (0.15406)  (0.08723)** (0.08007)** (0.11686)** 
Secondary  Complete  0.51418  0.77059 0.8178  0.86728 0.35887 0.65492 0.82362 0.58127 
  (0.18247 (0.09132)** (0.09754)** (0.11202)** (0.15382)*  (0.08562)** (0.08012)** (0.11603)** 
University  1.13945  1.19732 1.58627 1.31756 1.12051 1.13364 1.69184 1.10698 
  (0.18252 (0.10215)** (0.09929)** (0.11845)** (0.15386)** (0.09517)** (0.08206)** (0.12182)** 
Age  0.06239  0.03908 0.07573 0.10494 0.03112 0.03649 0.05057 0.05185 
  (0.00842 (0.00732)** (0.00560)** (0.00748)** (0.00776)** (0.00688)** (0.00545)** (0.00796)** 
Age  Squared  -0.00052  -0.00034 -0.00064 -0.00107 -0.00017 -0.00032 -0.00036 -0.00046 
  (0.00011 (0.00009)** (0.00007)** (0.00009)** (0.0001  (0.00008)** (0.00007)** (0.00010)** 
Race  0.20611  -0.06396  0.09677 0.10333 0.28899 0.10731 0.12775 0.12444 
  (0.05702 (0.05177)  (0.03536)** (0.06374)  (0.06501)** (0.04510)*  (0.04057)** (0.06102)* 
Region  II  0.20032  0.28793 0.31332 0.04567 0.10883 -0.08026  0.32004 0.02665 
  (0.19331 (0.13509)*  (0.07267)**  (0.10419) (0.14842) (0.12227) (0.07556)**  (0.11454) 
Region III  0.05616  0.1425  0.13634  0.01018 -0.10395  -0.21732  0.12939 0.14152 
  (0.19354 (0.12805) (0.07402) (0.09099) (0.14497) (0.11296) (0.07416) (0.09961) 
Region  IV  0.02654  0.11852  0.03828  -0.04015 -0.06165 -0.18234 0.0769  -0.05455 
  (0.19409 (0.12381) (0.07671) (0.08146) (0.15116) (0.10175) (0.0752)  (0.09878) 
Region  V  -0.07649  0.13011  0.02737  -0.09489 -0.13334 -0.23157 0.08995  -0.03922 
  (0.18736 (0.11105) (0.06485) (0.07244) (0.13762) (0.09029)*  (0.06319) (0.08308) 
Region  VI  0.11513  0.18427 0.13588 0.07709 0.02486 -0.20922  0.14127 -0.01205 
  (0.1871)  (0.11907) (0.06772)*  (0.07526) (0.13843) (0.10102)*  (0.06697)*  (0.08679) 
Region  VII  -0.00133  -0.02623 0.09601  -0.21021 -0.08868 -0.39609 0.1709  -0.16913 
  (0.18859 (0.11777) (0.06853) (0.07501)**  (0.13966) (0.09538)**  (0.06840)*  (0.08537)* 
Region  VIII  -0.01166  0.09049  0.0597  -0.16072 -0.09055 -0.29393 0.10913  -0.16204 
  (0.1857)  (0.11304) (0.06413) (0.07102)*  (0.13721) (0.09171)**  (0.06373) (0.08298) 
Region  IX  0.03146  0.04065  0.05447  -0.19496 -0.07939 -0.36262 0.11577  -0.17567 
  (0.19018 (0.11565) (0.07686) (0.07468)**  (0.14338) (0.09592)**  (0.07636) (0.08513)* 
Region  X  0.09657  0.15973 0.1031  -0.00496  0.00247 -0.22244  0.13751 0.00893 
  (0.18725 (0.11633) (0.06814) (0.07373) (0.13792) (0.09470)*  (0.06919)*  (0.08262) 
Region  XI  0.22755  0.32425 0.4022  0.14979 0.03327 -0.04378  0.45788 0.0814 
  (0.19053 (0.15364)*  (0.12912)**  (0.10542) (0.14793) (0.13076) (0.13356)**  (0.12189) 
Region  XII  0.18119  0.33064 0.30851 0.07431 0.07924 0.0328  0.33023 0.11986 
  (0.20926 (0.1703)  (0.08605)**  (0.14041) (0.16722) (0.16978) (0.08746)**  (0.13257) 
Region XIII  0.26282  0.38345  0.28823  0.18504 0.16846 -0.05263  0.31501 0.19441 
  (0.18179 (0.10756)** (0.06126)** (0.06440)** (0.13172)  (0.08661)  (0.06059)** (0.07632)* 
Constant  9.59456  9.88559 9.25362 9.08074 5.24515 5.3493  4.44671 5.22316 
   (0.28617 (0.19601)** (0.15196)** (0.20614)** (0.24451)** (0.18367)** (0.14206)** (0.21943)** 
Observations  5972  8859 13370  9541 5792 8546 12936  9194 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.33582  0.14158 0.39914 0.21522 0.36032 0.13913 0.40625 0.15344 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level. 
Region I is the base category. 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 34  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
TABLE A14 
Dominican Republic’s Regressions: Participation-Occupational Model 













Primary  Incomplete  0.40929    1.21182 1.34805 -0.7258259  -0.82504  -1.235567 
 (0.17236)**  (0.26461)**  (0.64168)*  (0.4182362)  (0.57128)  (0.5599747)* 
Primary Complete  0.63336  1.21297  1.0017  -1.146288  -0.42817  -1.346721 
 (0.20587)**  (0.30836)**  (0.66735  (0.4491006)*  (0.5903)  (0.579582)* 
Secondary  Incomplete  0.81179 1.20306 1.53333 -0.8516828*  -0.35332  -1.44468 
  (0.19164)** (0.27046)** (0.64478)** (0.4226916)*  (0.57586)  (0.567656)* 
Secondary Complete  1.1078  1.15289  1.893  -0.9391926  -0.36391  -1.545223 
  (0.19206)** (0.29546)** (0.64200)** (0.4263439)*  (0.57776)  (0.5695946)** 
Superior  1.63047 1.53499 2.36221 -1.574882  0.10008 -2.205882 
  (0.19837)** (0.28250)** (0.64287)** (0.4403442)**  (0.58638)  (0.5825123)** 
Age  0.24355 0.31194 0.10072 0.0969009*  0.09938 0.1481567 
  (0.02448)** (0.03533)** (0.04436)*  (0.0438797) (0.04055)** (0.0413005)** 
Age  Squared  -0.00352 -0.00443 -0.00071 -0.0001674  -0.0012  -0.0014537 
 (0.00032)**  (0.00044)**  (0.00062  (0.0005964)  (0.00052)*  (0.0005206)** 
Married  -0.4037  0.92505 0.11855 0.2098164  1.38908 1.002213 
  (0.08888)** (0.18536)** (0.14521  (0.1490697) (0.19925)** (0.2014621)** 
Region Distrito Nacional  0.25907  0.42643  -0.02076  -0.0220436  0.01673  -0.1693972 
 (0.07747)**  (0.13045)**  (0.12762  (0.1343044)  (0.13778)  (0.1396955) 
Ln  (Non-labour  income)  -0.21703 -0.37429 -0.41936 -0.4135545  -0.20007 -0.2630713 
  (0.07029)** (0.11659)** (0.10169)** (0.102849)**  (0.08983)*  (0.0919581)** 
Ln (Non-labour income)  -0.00221  0.00887 0.02496 0.0201339  0.01154 0.0143539 
  (0.00584  (0.00944) (0.00885)**  (0.009519)*  (0.00936) (0.0097216) 
No. of Children 0-3 Years Old  -0.38845  0.44225  -0.29413  -0.2666922  0.15401  0.3427621 
  (0.08107)**  (0.34576) (0.13344)*  (0.141514)  (0.18963) (0.1922474) 
No. of Children 4-6 Years Old   -0.27463  0.28704  -0.11334  -0.1505161  -0.34707  -0.2068835 
  (0.09376)**  (0.27546) (0.16011) (0.1601806)  (0.21177) (0.217224) 
No. of Girls 7-10 Years Old  -0.08119  0.20909  -0.02815  0.0399124  0.01836  0.1003435 
  (0.10091  (0.2846) (0.18026)  (0.1847877)  (0.2274) (0.225365) 
No. of Girls 11-15 Years Old  0.02351  0.02309  -0.18352  -0.1227641  0.20876  0.2126711 
  (0.09905  (0.17834) (0.16506) (0.163047)  (0.20476) (0.2077627) 
No. of Boys 7-10 Years Old   -0.27066  -0.00932  -0.1527  0.0914185  -0.29997  -0.1779796 
  (0.10347)**  (0.24436) (0.18484) (0.1744182)  (0.21198) (0.2202566) 
No. of Boys 11-15 Years Old   -0.01055  0.01585  -0.14714  -0.0387651  -0.08642  -0.0669969 
  (0.0968  (0.16356) (0.16602) (0.1520404)  (0.18202) (0.1835315) 
School  Attendance    -0.46448 -1.25791 -0.04371 0.2729058  -0.05361 -0.0316425 
  (0.11888)**  (0.15626)**  (0.16913) (0.1907317)  (0.18898) (0.2009216) 
Elderly  -0.24355 -0.03917 -0.1176  -0.0691069  -0.28758 -0.0898105 
 (0.09250)**  (0.1286)  (0.15058)  (0.1604106)  (0.14624)*  (0.1549951) 
No. of Unemployed  -0.10926  0.0165  -0.45633  -0.3766564  -0.29025  -0.4559633 
  (0.07783  (0.11572)  (0.12185)** (0.1244884)**  (0.11082)** (0.1112016)** 
No. of Informal  0.02762  0.22148  -0.09646  0.3353208  -0.0359  0.4469006 
  (0.05587  (0.07984)**  (0.09462) (0.0965225)**  (0.11202) (0.1149283)** 
Constant  -1.99453 -2.12962 -1.85201 0.1015397  0.21028  0.1815269 
   (0.50896)**  (0.78464)**  (0.99699)*  (0.8773517)  (0.92354)  (0.9436552) 
Observations 3983  3398  2306  2937 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.1387  0.2458  0.1357  0.1259 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level. 
Distrito Nacional is the base category. 
Unemployed is the occupational equation base category. 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. Working Paper  35 
 
TABLE A15 
Dominican Republic’s Regressions: Wage Model 
  Monthly Wage  Hourly Wage 


















Primary  Incomplete  -0.19784  0.19801 0.34924 0.23529 -0.01931  0.16085 0.35009 0.16963 
  (0.16597)  (0.13073) (0.10156)**  (0.07728)**  (0.22622) (0.12389) (0.11172)**  (0.07247)* 
Primary  Complete -0.11199  0.51033 0.62578 0.29542 0.06851 0.34725 0.61335 0.24989 
  (0.17814) (0.15219)** (0.11852)** (0.09539)** (0.22899)  (0.15545)*  (0.12502)** (0.08886)** 
Secondary  0.16429  0.58082 0.58285 0.35129 0.31529 0.44493 0.60132 0.29398 
  (0.17017) (0.13923)** (0.10395)** (0.08469)** (0.23024)  (0.13246)** (0.11391)** (0.08280)** 
Secondary  Complete  0.26971  0.65719 0.77886 0.52404 0.46272 0.52327 0.80015 0.44156 
  (0.16752) (0.14146)** (0.10344)** (0.08968)** (0.22862)*  (0.13100)** (0.11268)** (0.09515)** 
Superior  0.69405  1.05145 1.25905 0.48869 0.95937 0.90743 1.37015 0.51127 
  (0.16698) (0.16994)** (0.10813)** (0.10052)** (0.22772)** (0.16441)** (0.11350)** (0.09661)** 
Age  0.06664  0.0771  0.06859 0.10301 0.05513 0.07142 0.05783 0.08369 
  (0.01577) (0.01758)** (0.01318)** (0.01202)** (0.01578)** (0.02033)** (0.01247)** (0.01149)** 
Age  Squared  -0.00066  -0.00083 -0.00058 -0.00119 -0.00049 -0.00072 -0.00047 -0.00097 
  (0.00022) (0.00023)** (0.00019)** (0.00016)** (0.00022)*  (0.00027)** (0.00018)** (0.00015)** 
Region Distrito  0.21069  0.1068  0.15647 0.27346 0.24669 0.08349 0.10532 0.2208 
  (0.04894) (0.06232)  (0.04105)** (0.04165)** (0.04716)** (0.06593)  (0.03795)** (0.04193)** 
Constant  6.57345  5.71742 6.27646 6.02113 1.3519  0.94736 1.21673 1.2874 
   (0.31567) (0.32970)** (0.24457)** (0.22295)** (0.35155)** (0.36894)*  (0.23934)** (0.21824)** 
Observations  873  855 1295  1293  873 855 1295  1293 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.31356  0.1348  0.37624 0.1383  0.36816 0.09928 0.40084 0.10599 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level. 
Distrito Nacional is the base category. 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 36  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
TABLE A16 
El Salvador’s regressions: participation-occupational model 
  Participation Equation  Occupational Equation 
 











Primary Incomplete  0.2841  1.0282  0.14976  1.17788  1.17253  0.3347189 
 (0.10016)**  (0.20708)**  (0.66042)  (0.28761)**  (0.28761)**  (0.2630974) 
 Primary Complete  0.48141  1.13023  0.66442  1.32105  1.30794  0.124378 
 (0.13141)**  (0.24796)**  (0.70103)  (0.30853)**  (0.30880)**  (0.2912828) 
Secondary Incomplete  0.66177  1.35947  -0.13678  1.80415  1.78209  0.5750304 
 (0.17532)**  (0.30226)**  (0.77823)  (0.40547)**  (0.40530)**  (0.3900396) 
Secondary Complete  0.9995  1.20357  1.03839  1.82408  1.79904  0.0618819 
 (0.13073)**  (0.24207)**  (0.6566)  (0.30515)**  (0.30442)**  (0.2891353) 
University 1.63517  1.64473  0.79222  2.0565  2.01736  -0.405625 
 (0.15315)**  (0.26503)**  (0.6572)  (0.33274)**  (0.33709)**  (0.334201) 
Age 0.22444  0.23361  0.13894  0.08175  0.08176  0.0679124 
 (0.01787)**  (0.03073)**  (0.08242)*  (0.04269)*  (0.04292)*  (0.0421124) 
Age Squared  -0.00289  -0.00345  -0.00104  -0.00088  -0.00089  -0.0003552 
 (0.00023)**  (0.00038)**  (0.00113)  (0.00056)  (0.00056)  (0.0005445) 
Married  -0.45017 1.33254 0.57809  0.76436 0.77768  0.5929869 
 (0.07076)**  (0.14961)**  (0.26282)*  (0.15951)**  (0.16019)**  (0.1624182)**
Region Central 1  0.06563  -0.15363  0.47255  0.60212  0.60201  0.2502108 
 (0.09214)  (0.15858)  (0.3152)  (0.20253)**  (0.20242)**  (0.2025407) 
Region Central 2  -0.1017  -0.00638  0.99263  0.00818  0.00826  0.087018 
 (0.09426)  (0.16211)  (0.38227)**  (0.19757)  (0.1975)  (0.1945059) 
Region  Oriental  -0.32159 -0.18502 0.49205  0.14902 0.14071  0.4393384 
 (0.09391)**  (0.16333)  (0.34413)  (0.21423)  (0.2141)  (0.2157704)** 
Region Amss  0.30707  0.30161  0.38505  0.5221  0.51684  -0.0087929 
 (0.08039)**  (0.14164)*  (0.2444)  (0.16452)**  (0.16468)**  (0.1684901) 
Ln (Non-labour income)  -0.17103  -0.14578  -0.0136  -0.33868  -0.38485  -0.5906676 
 (0.08130)*  (0.12753)  (0.28188)  (0.13415)**  (0.13465)**  (0.1388471)**
Ln (Non-labour income)  -0.04058 -0.04484 -0.02797 0.04055 0.05201  0.075072 
 (0.01247)**  (0.01972)*  (0.0536)  (0.02448)*  (0.02378)*  (0.0247102)**
No. of Children 0-3 Years Old  -0.36352  0.1329  -0.35578  -0.06787  -0.05893  0.0913801 
 (0.07887)**  (0.24372)  (0.26574)  (0.17505)  (0.17463)  (0.1762863) 
No. of Children 4-6 Years Old   -0.24508  -0.20867  0.38345  -0.04325  -0.03698  0.0349996 
 (0.07624)**  (0.18551)  (0.30329)  (0.18196)  (0.18184)  (0.1891795) 
No. of Girls 7-10 Years Old  -0.24637  -0.00954  -0.14706  0.01688  0.02141  -0.0261779 
 (0.08924)**  (0.20223)  (0.33352)  (0.22083)  (0.22055)  (0.2246598) 
No. of Girls 11-15 Years Old  0.24074  0.07413  -0.1414  0.00298  0.00801  -0.1279207 
 (0.07347)**  (0.14205)  (0.27051)  (0.17779)  (0.17764)  (0.179174) 
No. of Boys 7-10 Years Old   -0.06703  -0.32133  0.02707  0.08351  0.09198  0.0556178 
 -0.08102  (0.16679)*  (0.31264)  (0.17646)  (0.17623)  (0.1799225) 
No. of Boys 11-15 Years Old   -0.15266  0.03171  0.35678  -0.07368  -0.06848  -0.1149408 
 (0.07282)*  (0.11861)  (0.25418)  (0.16137)  (0.16128)  (0.165908) 
School Attendance   -1.61617  -2.61527  0.73257  1.40385  1.41574  1.952634 
 (0.15858)**  (0.19157)**  (0.37823)*  (0.44238)**  (0.44342)**  (0.470112)*** 
Elderly -0.32305  -0.17933  -0.21423  -0.21453  -0.20752  -0.1387809 
 (0.06750)**  (0.13549)  (0.17104)  (0.14502)  (0.14533)  (0.1511439) 
No. of Unemployed  -0.40424  -0.13029  -0.7634  -0.81518  -0.80032  -0.9291054 
 (0.09257)**  (0.14565)  (0.21929)**  (0.16641)**  (0.16571)**  (0.1686155)**
No. of Informal  0.08699  0.07757  -0.19863  0.11429  0.10611  0.315907 
 (0.04232)*  (0.06895)  (0.13225)  (0.09594)  (0.09581)  (0.0930778)**
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Constant -2.36716  -1.65787  -1.41384  -1.66758  -1.66102  -0.2505503 
   (0.36560)**  (0.64178)**  (-1.54704)  (0.83484)*  (0.84275)*  (0.8075002) 
Observations 9922  7115  5464  5854 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.142  0.3412  0.2753  0.1003 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level. 
Occidental is the base category. 
Unemployed is the occupational equation base category. 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
 
TABLE A17 
El Salvador’s Regressions: Wage Model 
  Monthly Wage  Hourly Wage 


















Primary  Incomplete  0.28247 0.19888 0.16422 0.32107 0.50262 0.14453 -0.27477  0.49252 
 (0.15406)  (0.05508)**  (0.07967)*  (0.09916)**  (0.2888)  (0.10738)  (0.30251)  (0.14791)** 
 Primary Complete  0.33421  0.329  0.23051  0.42012  0.83074  0.20805  -0.47497  0.52474 
  (0.14964)*  (0.07799)** (0.08108)** (0.10881)** (0.27092)** (0.14972)  (0.29658)  (0.16883)** 
Secondary  0.43196 0.54471 0.31643 0.27375 0.87373 0.65547 -0.11553  -0.02203 
  (0.15699)** (0.09655)** (0.09130)** (0.13645)*  (0.31369)** (0.18456)** (0.33891)  (0.19783) 
Secondary  Complete  0.60226 0.31752 0.39249 0.67592 1.12873 0.26137 -0.15736  1.12351 
  (0.14981)** (0.07454)** (0.08083)** (0.11831)** (0.27557)** (0.14522)  (0.2901)  (0.18418)** 
University  1.12303 0.73926 0.92  0.96386 1.83843 0.20053 0.55938 1.07269 
  (0.14861)** (0.14288)** (0.08378)** (0.14434)** (0.26178)** (0.21169)  (0.29008)  (0.23913)** 
Age  0.0515  0.07144 0.06313 0.0771  0.07846 0.05348 0.03516 0.06382 
  (0.01500)** (0.01248)** (0.00870)** (0.01342)** (0.02883)** (0.01987)** (0.02495)  (0.02916)* 
Age  Squared  -0.00047 -0.00076 -0.00064 -0.00087 -0.00066 -0.00059 -0.00018 -0.00064 
  (0.00022)*  (0.00016)** (0.00012)** (0.00017)** (0.00039)  (0.00025)*  (0.00034)  (0.00035) 
Region  Central  1  0.00983  -0.02784 0.01818  0.04224  -0.10807 0.107  -0.10946 -0.03396 
  (0.04582) (0.05887) (0.04056) (0.06875) (0.09467) (0.08732) (0.17036) (0.14804) 
Region  Central  2  0.03382  -0.02363 -0.03024 0.01209  -0.13439 0.09913  -0.07984 0.00925 
  (0.05993) (0.06624) (0.04473) (0.07504) (0.15483) (0.11221) (0.19153) (0.1554) 
Region  Oriental  0.08465 0.08045 0.05626 0.09627 0.0606  0.19686 0.00753 0.07308 
  (0.05759) (0.06509) (0.05391) (0.07168) (0.10542) (0.10082) (0.18905) (0.15045) 
Region  Amss  0.01585  0.1171  0.05525  0.13945  -0.07854 0.16645  -0.08456 -0.05362 
  (0.04013) (0.05564)*  (0.03559) (0.06095)*  (0.10115) (0.09027) (0.1561)  (0.14381) 
Constant  3.57424 2.99261 3.71149 3.25728 -2.62463  -1.49178  -0.49221  -1.82137 
    (0.26517)** (0.23342)** (0.16271)** (0.26187)** (0.49131)** (0.37269)** (0.53712  (0.57083)** 
Observations  1926 3117 2603 2274 417  1060 345  614 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.40808 0.06069 0.31296 0.10779 0.51712 0.03139 0.41839 0.1416 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level. 
Occidental is the base category. 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 38  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
TABLE A18 
Mexico’s Regressions: Participation-Occupational Model 













Primary Incomplete  0.16459  1.34368  1.03243  0.1677588  0.8274  0.6684486 
 (0.10876  (0.21170)**  (0.9398)  (0.9203634)  (0.35838)*  (0.3592445)* 
Primary Complete  0.40854  1.85892  1.20715  -0.2076828  1.06516  0.620283 
 (0.11551)**  (0.24674)**  (0.93535)  (0.9172106)  (0.35837)**  (0.3605156)* 
Secondary Incomplete  0.85486  2.02326  1.16034  -0.4256752  1.07818  0.5466508 
 (0.14447)**  (0.25077)**  (1.00708)  (0.9914702)  (0.40376)**  (0.408447) 
Secondary Complete  0.72217  1.84891  1.48388  -0.3754404  1.10413  0.2853159 
 (0.12076)**  (0.25227)**  (0.92865)  (0.9094011)  (0.37498)**  (0.3786386) 
Superior 1.12842  1.67539  1.1284  -1.53653  1.23382  -0.0728029 
 (0.12351)**  (0.22444)**  (0.93919)  (0.9210601)*  (0.36507)**  (0.3695736) 
Age 0.22061  0.28517  0.12907  0.087153  0.24292  0.269421 
 (0.01380)**  (0.02579)**  (0.07668)*  (0.0771448)  (0.03866)**  (0.0393868)**
Age Squared  -0.0029  -0.00414  -0.00078  0.0001069  -0.00301  -0.0030729 
 (0.00017)**  (0.00032)**  (0.00111)  (0.0011132)  (0.00049)**  (0.0004989)**
Married -1.09773  1.30923  0.96468  1.381234  1.06035  1.031957 
 (0.05964)**  (0.12987)**  (0.32428)**  (0.3257156)** (0.17288)**  (0.1748851)**
Region Norte  -0.16303  0.22224  0.41132  0.0881624  -0.33581  -0.6239617 
 (0.09925)  (0.19722)  (0.50849)  (0.5154143)  (0.28651)  (0.2919953)** 
Region Noreste  -0.02312  0.28581  -0.29557  -0.2898431  -0.28286  -0.6671035 
 (0.09554)  (0.1913)  (0.42426)  (0.4324446)  (0.27764)  (0.2844082)** 
Region Occidente  0.07912  0.39928  -0.63002  -0.4616841  -0.30786  -0.3876492 
 (0.10127)  (0.21301)*  (0.43327)  (0.4388873)  (0.3095)  (0.3149396) 
Region Centro Norte  0.06268  0.4103  0.26039  0.2841189  -0.13017  -0.3400002 
 (0.08329)  (0.16777)**  (0.38815)  (0.3929797)  (0.25171)  (0.2555928) 
Region Centro Sur  -0.16681  0.11063  0.1356  0.4038715  -0.31363  -0.0608607 
 (0.09119)*  (0.17697)  (0.44929)  (0.4531472)  (0.27533)  (0.2795011) 
Region Oriente  0.02253  0.24384  -0.67924  -0.0291174  0.05147  0.2396577 
 (0.09381)  (0.1874)  (0.42245)  (0.4330744)  (0.29585)  (0.2999541) 
Region Sur  0.07615  -0.09403  -0.76031  0.0961592  -0.53833  -0.3178236 
 (0.10338)  (0.2233)  (0.45243)*  (0.454634)  (0.33476)  (0.3398086) 
Region Sureste  0.34201  0.44271  -0.59562  -0.1493938  1.21995  1.286209 
 (0.11659)**  (0.22710)*  (0.52664)  (0.5274757)  (0.40892)**  (0.4127089)**
Region Centro  0.0016  0.05576  -0.69417  -0.7813628  -0.21093  -0.1107125 
 (0.09154  (0.17272  (0.37409)*  (0.3831547)**  (0.27694)  (0.2822483) 
Ln (Non-labour income)  -0.09961  -0.13513  -0.06905  -0.1075094  -0.15421  -0.1589819 
 (0.00714)**  (0.01689)**  (0.03561)*  (0.0360094)** (0.03161)**  (0.0319014)**
Ln (Non-labour income)  0.00266 0.01211 0.02538 0.0119443  0.01527 0.0022653 
 (0.00109)**  (0.00222)**  (0.00539)**  (0.0054042)**  (0.00411)**  (0.0041599) 
No. of Children 0-3 Years Old  -0.39782  0.59313  0.60245  0.8949984  0.44297  0.4654724 
 (0.05706)**  (0.17977)**  (0.40492)  (0.40414)**  (0.23983)*  (0.2402164)* 
No. of Children 4-6 Years Old   -0.12955  0.09779  0.13847  0.3471745  0.3376  0.379751 
 (0.05819)*  (0.17436)  (0.42331)  (0.424351)  (0.35002)  (0.354192) 
No. of Girls 7-10 Years Old  -0.0656  0.34613  0.62268  0.6113566  -0.21701  -0.2057478 
 (0.066)  (0.19329)*  (0.4351)  (0.4322649)  (0.20536)  (0.2049122) 
No. of Girls 11-15 Years Old  0.05238  0.06207  -0.25582  -0.205607  0.09348  -0.0643857 
 (0.05045)  (0.11436)  (0.25571)  (0.2587286)  (0.15012)  (0.1510931) 
No. of Boys 7-10 Years Old   -0.14621  0.2072  0.43065  0.6195603  0.63081  0.688346 
 (0.06627)*  (0.14703)  (0.44954)  (0.4507027)  (0.31345)*  (0.316386)** 
No. of Boys 11-15 Years Old   -0.0731  0.07148  0.62306  0.7118802  0.26825  0.1986736 
 (0.05331)  (0.09407  (0.31931)*  (0.3163086)**  (0.17534)  (0.1766802) 
School Attendance   0.88655  1.47635  -0.77241  -0.9313242  -1.55361  -1.83512 
 (0.05885)**  (0.07072)**  (0.25767)**  (0.2611587)** (0.32753)**  (0.3291411)**
Elderly -0.16727  -0.04725  0.06412  -0.0406672  -0.10552  -0.0139292 
 (0.05919)**  (0.09712)  (0.18889)  (0.1988977)  (0.14564)  (0.1464348) 
Unemployed -0.01217  -0.13012  -0.98477  -1.112109  -0.94944  -0.9440394 
 (0.07182)  (0.17294)  (0.18493)**  (0.1917335)** (0.15407)**  (0.1544518)**
No. of Informal  0.11089  0.20242  0.03344  0.5423993  -0.22035  0.2919596 
 (0.03002)**  (0.06180)**  -0.13383  (0.1365191)** (0.08436)**  (0.0837858)**Working Paper  39 
 
 
Constant -6.24864  -9.63987  0.91387  3.581117  3.35696  4.194932 
   (0.30229)**  (0.49508)**  -1.67883  (1.690)**  (1.46264)*  (1.470205)*** 
Observations 16620  12521  8703  10878 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.122  0.3806  0.1874  0.1135 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level. 
Noroeste is the base category. 
Unemployed i the occupational equation base category. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
 
TABLE A19 
Mexico’s Regressions: Wage Model 
  Monthly Wage  Hourly Wage 


















Primary  Incomplete  0.16532 0.38821 0.33847 0.44196 0.13582 0.37738 0.32471 0.33874 
  (0.19159)  (0.12137)** (0.07328)** (0.10299)** (0.21193)  (0.11026)** (0.07857)** (0.10976)** 
Primary  Complete  0.54916 0.66223 0.47665 0.54153 0.51556 0.59083 0.48243 0.39966 
 (0.18936)**  (0.13471)**  (0.07617)**  (0.10335)** (0.21263)*  (0.11974)** (0.08071)** (0.11050)** 
Secondary  0.81212 0.90627 0.53675 0.63974 0.82761 0.8396  0.6067  0.53662 
 (0.19232)**  (0.14523)**  (0.08204)**  (0.11041)**  (0.21499)** (0.13845)** (0.08642)** (0.11914)** 
Secondary  Complete  0.91677 0.97119 0.68899 0.74103 0.93873 0.8526  0.72279 0.62995 
 (0.18851)**  (0.13365)**  (0.07750)**  (0.10921)**  (0.21164)** (0.12348)** (0.08216)** (0.11426)** 
Superior  1.23238 1.29704 1.14389 0.86043 1.36192 1.20724 1.28777 0.91957 
 (0.18716)**  (0.14774)**  (0.07539)**  (0.11030)**  (0.21075)** (0.13522)** (0.07945)** (0.11540)** 
Age  0.09261 0.08815 0.13038 0.1255  0.0789  0.08748 0.11037 0.08693 
 (0.01067)**  (0.01508)**  (0.00762)**  (0.00941)**  (0.00992)** (0.01367)** (0.00749)** (0.00940)** 
Age  Squared  -0.00095 -0.00101 -0.0014  -0.00146 -0.00073 -0.00099 -0.00114 -0.00098 
 (0.00015)**  (0.00019)**  (0.00010)**  (0.00012)**  (0.00014)** (0.00018)** (0.00010)** (0.00012)** 
Region  Norte  -0.13911 -0.37053 -0.17445 -0.2475  -0.07638 -0.31614 -0.13555 -0.29682 
  (0.06044)*  (0.12334)** (0.05106)** (0.08859)** (0.06079)  (0.10774)** (0.05182)** (0.08784)** 
Region  Noreste  -0.09908 -0.31768 -0.14254 -0.13008 -0.10436 -0.21982 -0.15825 -0.18901 
  (0.05878)  (0.12596)* (0.04758)**  (0.06596)* (0.05828)  (0.11068)* (0.04685)**  (0.06518)** 
Region  Occidente -0.17865 -0.17825 -0.23916 -0.0738  -0.11129 -0.1718  -0.27115 -0.13805 
  (0.06949)*  (0.11543) (0.05724)**  (0.07014) (0.06408) (0.10294) (0.05619)**  (0.06793)* 
Region  Centro  Norte  -0.23387 -0.31934 -0.1729  -0.15705 -0.21948 -0.22574 -0.18727 -0.21806 
 (0.05648)**  (0.10007)**  (0.04285)**  (0.06034)** (0.05667)** (0.08928)*  (0.04332)** (0.06092)** 
Region  Centro  Sur -0.26346 -0.4147  -0.24648 -0.23672 -0.22793 -0.35618 -0.25634 -0.39232 
 (0.05275)**  (0.11595)**  (0.04772)**  (0.06069)**  (0.05192)** (0.09730)** (0.04814)** (0.06308)** 
Region  Oriente  -0.29149 -0.40937 -0.34421 -0.45143 -0.24654 -0.43777 -0.36599 -0.53812 
 (0.06075)**  (0.10936)**  (0.05746)**  (0.06466)**  (0.06160)** (0.09353)** (0.05518)** (0.06360)** 
Region  Sur  -0.40992 -0.63428 -0.2933  -0.4831  -0.37461 -0.66086 -0.3558  -0.56656 
 (0.11361)**  (0.12087)**  (0.05500)**  (0.07418)**  (0.09395)** (0.10871)** (0.05728)** (0.08149)** 
Region  Sureste  -0.49947 -0.80652 -0.15359 -0.46967 -0.36656 -0.66162 -0.22262 -0.51014 
 (0.10786)**  (0.12984)**  (0.06053)*  (0.10137)**  (0.10076)** (0.11732)** (0.06241)** (0.09660)** 
Region  Centro  -0.04714 -0.10603 -0.13436 -0.02872 -0.04161 -0.09646 -0.17249 -0.17379 
  (0.05204) (0.10939) (0.04833)**  (0.06114) (0.05164) (0.0932)  (0.04825)**  (0.06023)** 
Constant  5.61926 5.09302 5.34519 5.2991  0.58335 0.25085 0.32167 0.85201 
    (0.26995)**  (0.28717)**  (0.15350)**  (0.20951)**  (0.27180)* -0.25798  (0.15463)* (0.21504)** 
Observations  4025 4619 6326 4683 4025 4619 6326 4683 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.27416 0.10806 0.30799 0.14781 0.33132 0.11635 0.33606 0.14275 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level. 
Noroeste is the base category. 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
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TABLE A20 
Paraguay’s Regressions: Participation-Occupational Model 













Primary    0.19075 0.84117 0.79371 -0.2650751  0.53404 0.3557676 
  (0.21847) (0.48397)*  (0.51403) (0.4512908)  (0.44039) (0.4234904) 
Secondary  Incomplete  -0.15239  -0.58278  0.90343 0.3117732  1.34174 1.157525 
 (0.20137  (0.25078)*  (0.50431)*  (0.4078646)  (0.49817)**  (0.4863606)** 
Secondary  Complete  0.33686 0.02897 1.11645 -0.3620151  1.19462 0.9825262 
  (0.15932)*  (0.24696)  (0.39528)** (0.3272921) (0.33194)** (0.3238781)*** 
Superior  0.56552 -0.20909  1.36599 -1.479501  1.75584 1.022416 
 (0.17065)**  (0.27845  (0.34995)**  (0.3034535)** (0.39150)** (0.3896325)*** 
Age  0.17639 0.34737 0.18255 0.0683014  0.20161 0.2475311 
 (0.03368)**  (0.04891)**  (0.09399)*  (0.0740547)  (0.06676)**  (0.0671644)*** 
Age  Squared  -0.00231 -0.0046  -0.00176 -0.0001923  -0.00257 -0.0028444 
 (0.00043)**  (0.00060)**  (0.00125  (0.0009635)  (0.00083)**  (0.0008357)*** 
Race 0.24189  0.09863  -0.40094  -0.290524  0.42517  0.4975724 
  (0.12821)*  (0.20295) (0.29381) (0.2581901)  (0.30334) (0.2984236)* 
Married -0.64788  1.05502  -0.41287  -0.4761411  0.59218  0.6248192 
 (0.13372)**  (0.30029)**  (0.31807  (0.2922994)  (0.33496)*  (0.3196278)* 
Region Central Urbano  -0.14199  -0.10939  -0.28889  -0.1353762  -0.1109  0.167137 
  (0.14917) (0.26575) (0.30635) (0.2795295)  (0.32598) (0.3229339) 
Region Resto Urbano  -0.39828  -0.36616  -0.47234  0.3830796  -0.2323  0.3297369 
 (0.12301)**  (0.19856)*  (0.3033)  (0.2555814)  (0.27907)  (0.2762959) 
Ln (Non-labour income)  -0.064  0.13663  -0.91762  -0.8891249  -0.1858  -0.001529 
 (0.08509  (0.12029  (0.25310)**  (0.2324981)** (0.15028) (0.1479739) 
Ln (Non-labour income)  -0.00436  -0.01904  0.05437 0.0538434  0.00424 -0.0133125 
 (0.00555  (0.00813)**  (0.01432)**  (0.0122736)** (0.01046) (0.0103099) 
No. of Children 0-3 Years Old  -0.34706  -0.09727  0.34624  0.1064012  0.70114  0.4811655 
 (0.11052)**  (0.43427)  (0.27979)  (0.2498882)  (0.35275)*  (0.346415) 
No. of Children 4-6 Years Old   -0.13334  0.45485  0.0232  0.2677735  0.23696  0.3482347 
  (0.12695) (0.35853) (0.35149) (0.3039247)  (0.40909) (0.4011323) 
No. of Girls 7-10 Years Old  -0.00225  -0.28828  0.72774  0.6135366  0.39691  0.2123226 
 (0.14218)  (0.51133)  (0.42852)*  (0.4005981)  (0.46317)  (0.4561443) 
No. of Girls 11-15 Years Old  -0.11197  0.08197  0.35804  0.3778773  -0.63751  -0.7330128 
 (0.14148)  (0.39463)  (0.41973)  (0.3635235)  (0.33195)*  (0.3129597)** 
No. of Boys 7-10 Years Old   0.09788  -0.2436  -0.77227  -0.2193341  0.31333  0.2322075 
 (0.1489)  (0.35865  (0.38122)*  (0.3270636)  (0.37101)  (0.3526408) 
No. of Boys 11-15 Years Old   -0.07853  -0.23784  0.82976  0.7792524  0.80651  0.7907324 
  (0.13976)  (0.29285)  (0.46105)* (0.4340322)*  (0.47114)* (0.4561366)* 
School Attendance   0.12399  0.23108  -0.03329  -0.0719905  -0.39934  -0.5076581 
 (0.11296)  (0.19365)  (0.26944)  (0.2363041)  (0.2558)  (0.2481928)** 
Elderly  -0.10373 -0.17279 -0.14542 -0.0814364  -0.19011 -0.1846058 
 (0.12319)  (0.18378  (0.26478)  (0.2490288)  (0.284)  (0.2829317) 
Unemployed  -0.18605 -0.16034 -0.24574 -0.5959666  -0.48328 -0.5513317 
 (0.12514)  (0.16576)  (0.20383)  (0.1895733)** (0.20363)** (0.1754951)*** 
No. of Informal  0.08587  0.15622  0.04256  0.2031035  0.27539  0.6619434 
 (0.05356  (0.09108)*  (0.14188  (0.1247113)  (0.15762)*  (0.1525947)*** 
Constant -0.27261  -2.48774  -1.1909  2.515621  -1.11358  -1.705875 
   (0.69212)  (0.91310)**  (2.0634)  (1.802601)  -1.34023  (1.344277) 
Observations 2360  1995  1450  1765 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.0687  0.2131  0.1787  0.1127 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level. 
Asunción is the base category. 
Unemployed is the occupational equation base category. 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
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TABLE A21 
Paraguay’s Regressions: Wage Model 
  Monthly Wage  Hourly Wage 


















Primary    0.52642 0.29404 0.19181 0.09649 0.37789 0.18042 0.12724 0.03151 
  (0.14125)**  (0.10266)**  (0.09969 (0.09153 (0.16059)*  (0.1289  (0.11184 (0.09335 
Secondary  Incomplete  0.4791  0.05891 0.14631 0.16035 0.46158 0.11104 0.14133 0.15908 
  (0.16823)**  (0.11542 (0.08988 (0.07121)*  (0.15100)**  (0.10055 (0.08528 (0.06575)* 
Secondary  Complete  0.33554 0.42498 0.43746 0.39149 0.36667 0.42531 0.42446 0.47116 
 (0.12860)**  (0.08357)**  (0.09008)**  (0.07752)**  (0.09870)** (0.08653)** (0.08390)** (0.07943)** 
Superior  0.71259 1.00616 0.73802 0.65012 1.01072 1.14142 0.87246 0.80944 
 (0.12435)**  (0.10075)**  (0.10110)**  (0.07833)**  (0.10583)** (0.09995)** (0.10678)** (0.08815)** 
Age  0.11522 0.04054 0.0794  0.0986  0.05799 0.05946 0.075  0.07334 
 (0.02400)**  (0.01447)**  (0.01573)**  (0.01325)**  (0.01992)** (0.01592)** (0.01727)** (0.01380)** 
Age  Squared  -0.00134 -0.00045 -0.00076 -0.00104 -0.00047 -0.00067 -0.0007  -0.00071 
  (0.00031)** (0.00019)*  (0.00020)** (0.00017)** (0.00027  (0.00021)** (0.00023)** (0.00018)** 
Race  0.23006 0.0337  0.32616 0.21299 0.23542 0.08526 0.43712 0.18774 
  (0.08611)**  (0.06483) (0.07763)**  (0.05999)**  (0.07118)**  (0.06662) (0.07686)**  (0.06267)** 
Region Central Urbano  -0.04867  0.01664  0.17078  0.16974  -0.05136  0.01469  0.15181  0.13601 
  (0.09341) (0.07018) (0.08630)*  (0.06570)**  (0.08385) (0.07471) (0.08767) (0.06920)* 
Region  Resto  Urbano -0.08178 -0.06574 0.10237  0.03157  -0.11073 -0.13087 0.07778  -0.0019 
  (0.09316) (0.06506) (0.06312) (0.05838) (0.08693) (0.06699) (0.06602  (0.06112) 
Constant  11.34372 11.96202 12.09582 11.41722 6.85184  6.50583  6.83777  6.50879 
   (0.47220)**  (0.26274)**  (0.29043)**  (0.25015)** (0.36949)** (0.27598)** (0.31072)** (0.25483)** 
Observations  336 1090  681 1160  336 1090  681 1159 
Adjusted  R-Squared 0.23752 0.13749 0.31778 0.19558 0.409  0.17386 0.38485 0.21195 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level. 
Asunción is the base category. 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 
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TABLE A22 
Uruguay’s Regressions: Participation-Occupational Model 













Primary Incomplete  1.17123  1.85981  0.43729  0.3999894  -0.11604  -0.0526877 
 (0.31980)**  (0.32561)**  (0.88855)  (0.5900856)  (0.9409)  (0.8581283) 
Primary Complete  1.68102  2.64139  0.92488  0.494297  -0.04988  -0.2012481 
 (0.31293)**  (0.31845)**  (0.87129)  (0.576212)  (0.93094)  (0.8489403) 
Secondary Incomplete  2.10156  3.41138  1.50021  0.5486666  0.2478  -0.0837941 
 (0.31165)**  (0.31758)**  (0.86979)*  (0.5757347)  (0.93042)  (0.8487689) 
Secondary  Complete  2.42065 3.72497 1.92774 0.6184062  0.24242 -0.0697384 
 (0.31363)**  (0.32451)**  (0.87145)*  (0.5789291)  (0.9335)  (0.8523527) 
Superior  2.71094 3.48838 2.61181 0.1308092  0.98602 -0.3401924 
 (0.31496)**  (0.32035)**  (0.87327)**  (0.5828153)  (0.93555)  (0.8556573) 
Age  0.23246 0.32678 0.15677 0.1251188  0.16117 0.1431963 
 (0.01120)**  (0.01867)**  (0.01956)**  (0.0183999)** (0.02035)**  (0.0204841)**
Age  Squared  -0.00317 -0.00459 -0.00169 -0.0009452  -0.00203 -0.0015178 
 (0.00014)**  (0.00022)**  (0.00025)**  (0.0002316)** (0.00026)**  (0.0002557)**
Married -0.53954  0.91279  -0.02766  0.004166  1.02746  0.7861002 
 (0.04661)**  (0.09424)**  (0.07608)  (0.0733809)  (0.09675)**  (0.0974649)**
Region  Interior  0.43066 0.23039 0.41371 -0.0833933  0.17362 -0.1812571 
 (0.04157)**  (0.06979)**  (0.07025)**  (0.0657705)  (0.07727)*  (0.0774254)** 
Ln (Non-labour income)  -0.62122  -1.43559  -0.82699  -0.7146447  -0.55814  -0.4732499 
 (0.19356)**  (1.03108)  (0.21341)**  (0.2150201)** (0.10897)**  (0.1104488)**
Ln (Non-labour income)  0.00764 0.04279 0.05085 0.0328708  0.02922 0.0153609 
  (0.01239)  (0.06348)  (0.01450)** (0.0147943)**  (0.00877)** (0.0090136)* 
No. of Children 0-3 Years Old  -0.4679  -0.08791  -0.29341  -0.1082387  0.02357  0.0685441 
 (0.05002)**  (0.15429)  (0.08399)**  (0.0804732)  (0.11735)  (0.117618) 
No. of Children 4-6 Years Old   -0.3523  -0.1101  -0.10082  -0.1738905  -0.02225  0.1175951 
 (0.05553)**  (0.1373)  (0.09473)  (0.089587)*  (0.12151)  (0.1217176) 
No. of Girls 7-10 Years Old  -0.27288  -0.33637  -0.25752  -0.2225585  -0.24451  -0.0871954 
 (0.05499)**  (0.12491)**  (0.08808)**  (0.0824331)** (0.11105)* (0.1087066) 
No. of Girls 11-15 Years Old  -0.15948  -0.08917  -0.21762  -0.0568007  0.10793  0.0755111 
 (0.04854)**  (0.09946)  (0.08074)**  (0.0715182)  (0.10282)  (0.1019828) 
No. of Boys 7-10 Years Old   -0.28217  -0.05878  -0.21335  -0.227014  -0.17943  -0.1996164 
 (0.05285)**  (0.11799)  (0.08913)**  (0.0818564)** (0.10150)* (0.0997722)** 
No. of Boys 11-15 Years Old   -0.23826  -0.18697  -0.17869  -0.104944  -0.13049  -0.2085074 
 (0.04721)**  (0.08225)*  (0.07986)*  (0.073452)  (0.08564)  (0.0855447)** 
School Attendance   -0.95897  -1.36988  -0.79712  -0.4048747  -1.01546  -0.8930219 
 (0.07335)**  (0.09422)**  (0.11027)**  (0.1119722)** (0.11117)**  (0.1176072)**
Elderly  -0.08347 -0.1647  -0.02903 -0.1137645  -0.25815 -0.083463 
 (0.03978)*  (0.06058)**  (0.06605)  (0.064577)*  (0.06893)**  (0.0680664) 
Unemployed  0.17233  0.1377  -0.26448 -0.4012164  -0.42193 -0.5201893 
 (0.04630)**  (0.06896)*  (0.06705)**  (0.0630343)** (0.06005)**  (0.0606579)**
No. of Informal  0.06275  0.13349  -0.14048  0.2225958  -0.11638  0.3046883 
 (0.02877)*  (0.04620)**  (0.04931)**  (0.0445454)** (0.05073)*  (0.0492061)**
Constant -0.44386  2.3942  -0.82352  0.8049234  0.55676  0.9515392 
   (0.84843)  (4.15246)  (1.24091)  (1.048345)  -1.05949  (0.989771) 
Observations 14803  12839  9136  11129 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.1459  0.3155  0.1276  0.1025 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level. 
Montevideo is the base category. 
Unemployed is the occupational equation base category. 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. Working Paper  43 
 
TABLE A23 
Uruguay’s Regressions: Wage Model 
  Monthly Wage  Hourly Wage 


















Primary  Incomplete  0.34978 0.18755 0.23365 -0.3347  0.58194 0.5812  0.3078  0.05262 
  (0.12864)** (0.3119)  (0.28591)  (0.16384)*  (0.13561)** (0.27609)*  (0.28104)  (0.13799) 
Primary  Complete  0.57674 0.44158 0.48234 -0.11256  0.82198 0.70134 0.56293 0.23183 
  (0.05974)**  (0.30793) (0.27834) (0.16028) (0.08969)**  (0.27232)*  (0.27396)*  (0.13513) 
Secondary  Incomplete  0.8274  0.62783 0.70838 0.27716 1.09034 0.82947 0.79193 0.54802 
  (0.05174)** (0.30833)*  (0.27855)*  (0.1599)  (0.08677)** (0.27286)** (0.27421)** (0.13493)** 
Secondary  Complete 1.06922 0.93385 0.93321 0.47225 1.36701 1.03135 1.01162 0.76501 
  (0.05182)** (0.30923)** (0.27894)** (0.16153)** (0.08763)** (0.27386)** (0.27461)** (0.13692)** 
Superior  1.4288  1.23185 1.52198 0.97047 1.9323  1.45199 1.78498 1.32171 
  (0.05145)** (0.31172)** (0.27942)** (0.16822)** (0.08698)** (0.27639)** (0.27495)** (0.14295)** 
Age  0.09094 0.05724 0.10886 0.11615 0.07349 0.04789 0.07505 0.07112 
  (0.00815)** (0.00794)** (0.00669)** (0.00692)** (0.00779)** (0.00743)** (0.00611)** (0.00609)** 
Age  Squared  -0.00088 -0.00055 -0.00103 -0.0012  -0.00064 -0.00046 -0.00064 -0.00069 
  (0.00011)** (0.00010)** (0.00008)** (0.00009)** (0.00010)** (0.00009)** (0.00008)** (0.00008)** 
Region  Interior  0.19677 0.28505 0.1455  0.08995 0.22157 0.41142 0.20155 0.17383 
  (0.02829)** (0.03019)** (0.02275)** (0.02582)** (0.02702)** (0.02755)** (0.02150)** (0.02366)** 
Constant  5.13495 5.46673 5.21703 5.35833 0.03406 0.66523 0.50424 0.83027 
    (0.16152)** (0.33752)** (0.30075)** (0.20262)** (0.17016)  (0.30119)*  (0.29209  (0.17276)** 
Observations  3333 3729 5023 4528 3333 3729 5023 4528 
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.27799 0.13914 0.36609 0.22744 0.37265 0.16263 0.40592 0.21708 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level. 
Montevideo is the base category. 
Source: authors’ calculation based on the respective national household surveys. 44  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
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1. These transmission channels and others are better explained in Klasen and Lamanna (2003) and DFID (2008).  
2. This analysis considers the conceptual framework developed by Morrison et al. (2007). 
3. This analysis has benefited from the literature review by Altonji and Blank (1999). 
4. Even though, in the model presented, the individual “decides” whether to work or not and whether to be 
unemployed or formal or informal, this does not mean that he/she does not face barriers when making the decision. 
That is, some barriers might be limiting the options that the individual faces. 
5. The dataset for Argentina, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Mexico did not have this information. We 
therefore omitted this variable in the analysis of these countries.  
6. In Paraguay, we aggregated the primary complete and incomplete in only one dummy variable, since the number of 
observations was small. 
7. For the countries where we could identify the mother of the children, these variables represent the number of 
children for each women (Brazil, Paraguay and Chile). However, for the countries on which we do not have this 
information, they represent the number of children in the household (Argentina, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Mexico, Uruguay). 
8. In Brazil (white and non-white), Chile (indigenous and non-indigenous) and Paraguay (indigenous and non-
indigenous). 
9. Actually, there would be many possibilities in the sequence to be simulated, and the result would change to each 
order chosen; that is, this decomposition methodology is path-dependent. To avoid this issue, the maximum numbers 
of sequences could be considered so that Shapley values could be estimated (based on the average of all results) as 
formally asserted by Shorrocks (1999). Since we are more interested in the counterfactual interpretation and in the 
comparison among each aspect of gender inequalities, we considered the effect that each gender inequality would 
have individually as if all others remained unchanged. 
10. We could have used the national poverty line in each country, but the poverty incidence in these countries varies 
approximately in the interval 20–40 per cent. Hence our poverty lines reproduce the reality in these countries.  
11. Of course the twentieth percentile poverty lines have different meanings in the countries analysed. However, we are 
more interested in comparisons within countries and not among them. Thus the results presented here show what 
would happen to the 20 per cent poorest in each country for each simulation exercise. It is important to note that these 
results would not be significantly different for the thirtieth percentile poverty lines. 
12. The original values of the poverty indicators and the Gini index for each country are presented in the Appendix. 
13. All these proportions are based on the National Household Surveys used, except for Argentina and Uruguay, whose 
surveys are only for urban areas. For Argentina we used official statistics produced for 2001 by Indec (Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística y Censos), and for Uruguay we used official statistics produced for 2004 by Ine (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística).  
14. Each dataset comprises an urban sample size of 27,277 households/93,558 individuals (Argentina); 101,697 
households/343,740 individuals (Brazil); 42,925 households/160,093 individuals (Chile); 5,734 households/22,143 
individuals (Dominican Republic); 8,757 households/34,901 individuals (El Salvador); 15,160 households/59,417 
individuals (Mexico); 2,566 households/10,672 individuals (Paraguay); 18,465 households/55,587 individuals (Uruguay). 
15. Proportion of imputed wages: 8.00 per cent in Argentina, 1.20 per cent in Brazil and 11.74 per cent in El Salvador. We 
used the hotdeck method and we ordered the datasets by gender, occupational category, educational level and age. 
16. These statistics may differ from other publications since we consider only the adult (18–64 year-old) population in 
urban areas, and we exclude workers in either agriculture or public occupations. 
17. This gap could be even higher if we were considering public workers. International
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